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ABSTRACT
Shipbuilding in the United States is examined in the context of
its productivity problem and the possible solutions offered by modern
shipbuilding techniques. Specifically, group technology is applied to
naval shipboard piping systems. A nine digit code is developed to iden-
tify pipe assembly manufacturing attributes, with emphasis placed on
utilization of the code for workload balancing and reduction of setup
time. Use of the code for rudimentary shop routing is also discussed.
The code is shown to serve as an excellent means of organizing
pipe assembly information into a usable data base. FFG-7 pipe assembly
statistics are used as the basis for a quantitative analysis of pipe shop
work processes. Incomplete data limits the ability to conduct accurate
workload balancing forecasts at the present time. Use of the coding
scheme would help to fill that gap because of its inherent work content
estimating capability; however, additional data is also needed in order
to develop a more accurate manhour requirement algorithm.
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SHIPBUILDING IN THE U.S. TODAY
1 .1 Overview
Phrases such as "flexible automation" and "factory of the future"
pervade the vocabulary of those seeking to boost future industrial pro-
ductivity. Indeed, factory automation is a powerful tool. for achieving
higher productivity, and its rapid growth is unmistakably one of the
predominant trends of this and future decades. Shipbuilding, however,
has been slow to jump on the automation bandwagon. Low quantity produc-
tion and high unit cost make ships less than an ideal target for the
application of robotics technology. Nevertheless, a strong desire to
reduce shipbuilding costs is forcing the industry to examine methods of
implementing the automation technology that has been so successful in
other industries. The quest for automation, however, must be preceded by
a quest for innovation—innovation in the basic industrial process by
which ships are built. After shipbuilding work has been restructured
into its most logical and efficient organization, then it is appropriate
to see how that work might be automated.
This thesis attempts to take a comprehensive look at shipbuilding
in the United States today, then focuses on the subject of innovation of
the industrial process, with piping system fabrication receiving a de-
tailed analysis. The objective will be to improve piping fabrication
productivity through the application of modern industrial engineering
principles, particularly group technology. The remainder of this chapter
is devoted to overviewing the problems in the U.S. shipbuilding industry
today. Chapter 2 discusses methods used to increase productivity in
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World War II. Chapter 3 outlines the naval ship design process and
delineates the various costs involved in naval ship acquisition. Modern
industrial engineering techniques and their applications to shipbuilding
are covered in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 focuses on piping systems and de-
tails the industrial processes involved in piping system fabrication.
Chapter 6 looks specifically at applying group technology to pipe fabri-
cation through the design of a coding and classification scheme. The
practical use of this code in a shipyard pipe shop is the subject of
Chapter 7. Finally, a summary and conclusion are given in Chapter 8.
1 .2 Introduction
Shipbuilding in the U.S. today is among the least competitive of
this country's international industries. It is a business plagued by low
market share, high prices, schedule delays, and unsteady demand. It is
indeed an unfortunate situation for an industry which, forty years ago,
had amazed the world with wartime shipbuilding achievements that few had
thought possible. These achievements will receive detailed scrutiny in
Chapter 2; the intent of this chapter is to briefly trace the degradation
of the U.S. position in the world shipbuilding market, to overview the
present state of affairs in U.S. shipbulding, and to describe the nature
of the current U.S. shipbuilding problem.
1 .3 Shipbuilding Since World War II
Following World War II, Daniel Ludwig, owner of National Bulk
Carriers, desired to build very large iron-ore carriers for the U.S.-
Venezuela trade.
(
1 ) Since his company's yard in Norfolk, Virginia
(Welding Shipyards), was too small, he sought to buy an existing facility
elsewhere that could handle the task. Elmer Hann, who came to work for
NBC after managing the Swan Island shipyard for Henry Kaiser during the
war, led the search and eventually decided on the Kure Naval Shipyard in
Japan. The yard had a 150,000 dwt capacity dry dock with good cranes,
11

and the Japanese were completely willing to lease portions of the facil-
ities. A ten-year lease was signed in 1951, marking the beginning of the
Japanese revolution in shipbuilding. Japan's industries were struggling
to get back on their feet, so its scientists, engineers, and indus-
trialists were eager to learn everything they could from any available
source. The Kure Shipyard lease specifically required that NBC's activ-
ities remain open to interested Japanese engineers, over 4000 of whom
ended up visiting the yard during the course of the lease.
Elmer Hann taught the Japanese organization of work in
accordance with the basic principles of Group Technology,
emphasis on welding without distortion to control costs,
the importance of college-educated middle managers trained
in the entire shipbuilding system, etc. With such methods
and only pre-World War II shipyards, by 1964 Japanese yards




Concurrently with Elmer Hann's work, the Japanese became intensely
interested in the statistical control work of Dr. W. Edwards Deming.
Dr. Hisashi Shinto, Chief Engineer under Elmer Hann (and later president
of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co.), was the key figure in ap-
plying statistical control methods to Japanese shipbuilding. The results
were so dramatic that the Japanese society of Naval Architects reported
in 1967 that statistical control "laid the foundation of modern ship-
construction methods and made it possible to extensively develop auto-
mated and specialized welding. "(3)
No such revolution was occurring in the United States during the
same time period. By 1962, the U.S. share of world shipbuilding was only
4.9% of the gross registered tonnage. (4) The situation was worsened by
the slowed growth of productivity in the 1960 's. For U.S. industry as a
whole, productivity was growing at only 3.1% annually by the mid- 1960' s,
compared to 11% in Japan and 5 to 6% in Western Europe. By the end of
the decade, output per manhour in the U.S. was growing at only 1.7 per-
cent per year, much less than the growth rate of wages. (5) Since
shipbuilding is labor intensive, this productivity-wage gap had a dev-
astating impact. By 1973, the U.S. ranked tenth in merchant ships under
12

construction and on order, with only 2.6% of the world total. (6) The
1973 selling price of an 86,000 deadweight ton tanker was about $30 mil-
lion for a U.S. built ship, compared to about $18.5 million for one built
in Japan. Northern European shipyards were also utilizing advanced con-
struction techniques, and the price of an equivalent ship built in Sweden
was about $20 million, w) U.S. companies began to improve their tech-
niques and facilities in the 1970's, but these improvements have only
recently produced measurable results. Consequently, U.S. shipbuilding
competitiveness continued to decline through the rest of the 1970's.
John Arado, Vice President of Chevron Shipping Company, stated in 1983:
In our latest survey of prices around the world, U;S.
prices for tankers were 90% higher than in Europe and 2 to
3 times higher than in the Far East. ... the delivery
situation in the U.S. seems, if anything, to be worsening.
Unfortunately, long and delayed deliveries in U.S. yards
appear to be a way of life.'**)
1 .4 The Productivity Problem
Higher wages are frequently blamed for the high cost of U.S. built
ships, but low productivity is the real source of the problem. A&P
Appledore Limited compared several U.S. yards with four comparably sized
foreign yards building merchant ships and concluded in 1980 that "produc-
tivity in the best Japanese and Scandinavian yards is on the order of
100% better than in major U.S. shipyards."^) a major U.S. tanker
owner compared labor costs for 1983 ship deliveries in the U.S., Japan,
and Europe. While wage rates were slightly lower in both Japan and
Europe, direct labor hours were significantly lower. Japan required only
46% of the U.S. direct labor hours to build a similar ship, and the
European yard required only 57% of the hours. Material costs were also
lower (70% and 78%). An even more detailed study was done by the Leving-
ston Shipbuilding Company in 1980. The study compared labor hours and
material costs at IHI with those at Levingston for construction of a
modified IHI designed bulk carrier. The results, shown in Table 1.1,
reveal that IHI was able to construct a similar ship with only 27% of the
labor hours and 65% of the material costs of the U.S. yard.
13
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ALL ITEMS 0.27 0.65
There are many possible reasons to explain why U.S. shipbuilding
technology fell so far behind—sporadic demand, a weak supplier base,
poorly designed subsidies, over restrictive standards and regulations,
cultural factors, etc. While a thorough analysis of each of these issues
is beyond the scope of this thesis, there are several which must be ad-
dressed. The fundamental difference between good and poor shipyards is
the organization and control of shipbuilding work. It is not high-tech
facilities or quantity production (although these certainly can be fac-
tors). The maximum difference in total construction cost between pre-
World War II Japanese shipyards which have been modernized and the newest
shipyards which incorporate extensive automation is roughly 12%.( 11 )
This difference, while significant, is but a fraction of the cost differ-
ential between Japanese and U.S. yards. Quantity production will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 2, when it will be estimated that it
increased World War II efficiency by 100%. Nevertheless, a well orga-
nized shipyard can overcome many of the inherent inefficiencies of small
quantity production. IHI of Japan, for example, is extremely productive
in spite of the fact that in 1982 it "delivered 16 ships, no two iden-
tical, to 15 owners in 11 countries," while also producing complex naval
ships and a polyethylene plant.
(
1 2) There is no doubt that it could
have been even more productive producing 16 identical ships, but that is
just an added benefit from the learning curve; it would be in addition to
the more fundamental advantage that is derived from restructuring the
14

work so as to achieve a well organized and controlled industrial proc-
ess. Such reorganization is just beginning to achieve significant re-
sults in the U.S. and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
1 .5 Naval Shipbuilding
All the discussion so far has been on merchant ships, yet the
majority of shipbuilding in the U.S. is and will continue to be naval
ships. Not only would it be difficult for merchant shipbuilders to
recapture a significant market share from the Japanese and Northern
Europeans, but it will also be very difficult to compete with Far Eastern
countries such as Taiwan and China, which are now entering the shipbuild-
ing industry. The extremely low wages earned in these countries gives
them a significant advantage over even the most efficient foreign firms.
Naval shipbuilding, on the other hand, will always be done in the U.S.
for security and strategic reasons. There are currently 17 privately
owned U.S. shipyards actively engaged in naval shipbuilding with a pro-
jected 5 year total value of $88.8 billion. These yards are listed in
Table 1.2 along with the most complex type of ship each yard produces.
Some of the noncombatant yards are in the process of moving toward com-
batant ship construction, and there are 7 additional private yards either
engaged in naval ship conversion or actively seeking navy contracts.
Shipbuilders do not compete in the world market with their naval
products in the same manner that they do with their merchant products.
Furthermore, naval ship design is more specialized to suit each country's
needs; accurate comparison of naval shipbuilding productivity is there-
fore more difficult. The limited comparisons that have been made, how-
ever, do not show the same schedule and cost gap between U.S. and foreign
shipyards that characterizes merchant shipbuilding.
(
1 3 ) This could
either mean that U.S. yards do a comparatively better job with naval
ships, possibly because of more steady demand, or that foreign yards have
not yet solved the more difficult problem of applying modern shipbuilding
techniques to complex warships. The real answer probably lies somewhere
15

Table 1.2. Shipyards currently involved in naval ship
construction. (14)
Combatant
Nuclear- Non-Nuclear Noncombatant. Coastal
($34 billion) ($30 billion) ($24 billion) ($0.8 billion)

























t Currently employing Japanese consultants'^)
in the middle. This thesis will include discussion of both naval and
merchant shipbuilding—most, of the experience is with merchant ships, but




SHIPBUILDING IN WORLD WAR II
2.1 Introduction
Any comprehensive examination of shipbuilding productivity must
(16)include a look at the ship production methods used in World War II.
The speed with which ships were built during the war was staggering.
Between 1939 and 1945, a total of 5777 ships were delivered in the U.S.
Maritime Commission program. In monetary terms, these ships represented
over $13 billion in contracts. Naval ships, although only one-fourth the
number, (17) represented an even greater financial investment, totalling
over $18 billion (exclusive of ordnance costs). This chapter, however,
will deal exclusively with the ships which fell under the jurisdiction of
the Maritime Commission. These included some military-type vessels, such
as armed transport ships, but were primarily cargo ships and tankers.
The principles which will be discussed in later chapters are better
demonstrated by the merchant shipbuilding program, and data on merchant
shipbuilding was much more readily available.
2. 2 Pre-war Shipbuilding in the U.S.
Following World War I, U.S. shipbuilding sank into a deep reces-
sion. This slump continued in merchant shipbuilding until passage of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which established the U.S. Maritime Commis-
sion and empowered it to use subsidies to stimulate merchant ship con-
struction. At the time, there were only 7 companies in the U.S. building
17

ocean-going ships. These companies and their respective shipyards are
listed in Table 2.1. A number of other companies, most notably the Todd
Shipyards Corporation, were involved in ship repair.




Newport News SB & DD
Federal SB & DD
New York SB
















Owned by U.S. Steel
Owned by" Sun Oil
Submarines only
Destroyers only
(SB = Shipbuilding, DD = Dry Dock)
The Maritime Commission, under the direction of RADM Emory S. Land
(later VADM), aggressively pursued its goal of rebuilding the U.S. mer-
chant marine. It became deeply involved in every phase of shipbuilding,
from ship design to contract award to facilities development. In 1938 it
enacted its "long range program," which called for the construction of 50
ships per year for 10 years. These ships were to be of a design which
came to be known as "standard-types," thereby distinguishing them from
emergency, military, and minor-types of ships. Standard dry cargo car-
riers were designated C-types and were further categorized as C1 , C2, or
C3, depending on displacement. The major design characteristics of these
are listed in Table 2.2.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 had given the Navy a voice in mer-
chant ship design, since there was the possibility that merchants might
18

Table 2.2. Standard cargo ships. C9)
Displacement Length Speed
Ship type ( tons
)
(ft) (kts)
C1 2400 418 14.0
C2 4500 460 15.5
C3 5400 492 16.5
need to be quickly converted to military use in time of war. Standard-
type ships reflected this influence primarily through their higher
speeds. Previous designs had used reciprocating engines and had top
speeds of around 11 knots. Standard-types used high speed turbines with
double reduction gears (a fairly new technology at that time), thereby
allowing both the turbines and the propeller to turn at their most effi-
cient speeds. The result was faster ships with record fuel economy. The
C3's also incorporated high temperature, high pressure steam plants,
which actually enabled some of them to exceed their design speed by as
much as 3 knots.
Another significant feature of the C-types was standardization of
design. Previously, each merchant ship had been custom built for the
particular route it was to be used on. In designing the C-types, the
Maritime Commission consulted with the operating companies and came up
with 3 designs of varying displacement that were fairly flexible in their
end use possibilities. Minor modifications could then be' made after con-
struction. The Maritime Commission also changed from single ship con-
tracts to contracting for 4 to 6 identical ships at one time. These
changes were made with the explicit purpose of facilitating the implemen-
tation of mass production techniques in shipbuilding.
2.3 Shipbuilding Expansion
The outbreak and growth of war in Europe in 1939 and 1940 made it
necessary that the U.S. accelerate its shipbuilding schedule, both to
support European allies and to prepare for possible U.S. involvement. In
January 1941, the U.S. embarked on the first of what historians now refer
19

to as the five waves of expansion of ship production goals. The first
wave called for 60 ships to be delivered to the British, and 200 more to
be built for U.S. use. Since the turbines and reduction gears used in
standard-types were in short supply and could not support such an ambi-
tious building program, a simpler design was decided on. These "emergen-
cy ships," which later came to be known as Liberty ships, were to have
reciprocating engines with low pressure boilers and a top speed of only
11 knots. The second and third waves occurred later in 1941, then the
fourth and fifth waves occurred in the first few months following the
attack on Pearl Harbor. Production goals came to be set in deadweight
tons rather than number of ships, since the critical need was for cargo-
carrying capacity. By the end of February 1942, following the fifth
wave, U.S. merchant shipbuilding goals stood at 9 million deadweight tons
in 1942 and 15 million deadweight tons in 1943. Each Liberty ship was
about 11,000 deadweight tons. Despite serious doubts as to whether these
goals could be achieved, the 2-year total was, in fact, exceeded by more
than 3 million tons (although 1942 fell slightly short). Figure 2-1
shows the deadweight tons actually produced in the Maritime Commission



























Although deadweight tons were heavily publicized during the war in
order to stress the need for cargo-carrying capacity, displacement tons
are a more accurate measure of industrial output. Figure 2-2 shows the
displacement tonnage produced on a monthly basis from 1942 to 1945.
Liberty ships displaced approximately- 3500 tons each.
DISPLACE-
M£MT TONS
Figure 2-2. Displacement tons of ships produced in the Maritime Commis-
sion program. (21)
2.4 Facilities Expansion
The facilities expansion that enabled these tremendous production
achievements is noteworthy and will be outlined here. As noted in Ta-
ble 2.1, only 7 companies were building ocean-going ships in the late
1930's. As shipbuilding increased under the Maritime Commission's long-
range program, however, this number grew rapidly, and 11 other companies
could be added to the list by the end of 1940. They are listed in Ta-
ble 2.3. None of these, nor any of the previous 7, had any idle shipways
in the fall of 1940. When the first wave of expansion began, therefore,
it was necessary to expand even further. Some existing yards were en-
larged, and 8 "emergency" yards with a total of 61 shipways were started
21





























in early 1941. These are listed in Table 2.4. As shipbuilding require-
ments continued to grow through the fifth wave of expansion, the Maritime
Commission attempted to meet the requirements by increasing productivity,
adding more shipways to existing yards, and building new yards. Since
building ways were the critical facilities limitation, time on the ways
became the critical measure of productivity. At the beginning of the
war, contracts specified delivery schedules that called for an output of
2 ships per way per year. By mid-1942, the goal was 6 ships per way per
year. The actual production rate, however, was increasing more slowly
than desired, so additional yards and ways were built. Figure 2-3 shows
the location of the U.S. shipyards producing ocean-going vessels by the
end of 1942 as well as the total number of shipways either in use or
under construction.

































































Figure 2-3. Shipyards and shipways.
(
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Management of the new yards came primarily from established ship-
builders. However, the most spectacular productivity gains were being
made by a newcomer named Henry J. Kaiser. Although Kaiser was new to
shipbuilding, he had numerous other industrial achievements, including
the San Francisco to Oakland Bay Bridge and the Hoover, Bonneville, and
Grand Coulee dams. He originally became involved with shipbuilding
through joint ownership of the Seattle-Tacoma yard with Todd, and by the
end of the war he owned and managed 7 shipyards and shared ownership in 3
others. The 7 under his management were Portland (Oregon), Vancouver
(Washington), Swan Island (Oregon), and 4 yards in Richmond (Cali-
fornia). Another name worth noting is that of Andrew Higgins. Higgins
was a Louisiana industrialist who, in 1942, had a contract to construct a
44-way yard in New Orleans. His intention was to produce ships on assem-
bly lines, but his contract was cancelled in July of 1942 because of
23

shipbuilding overcapacity. The design of the New Orleans yard will be
discussed later in more detail.
2.5 Shipyard Productivity
Increases in shipyard productivity were heavily relied on in the
third, fourth, and fifth waves of expansion to meet the new production
goals. Indeed, the productivity achievements seem phenomenal by today's
standards. Liberty ships averaged only 28 days on the ways at the end of
1943, and another 13 days in outfitting. They were thus being produced
at a rate of 13 ships per way per year. The record for an individual
ship was 4 days on the ways at Kaiser's Richmond No. 2 yard, and the re-
cord sustained rate was 17 days on the ways at Kaiser's Portland yard.
There were 6 primary factors which enabled the incredible ship-






(6) Sense of urgency
2.5.1 Design Simplification
It should be recalled that the Maritime Commission's original
long-range program called for the construction of relatively high per-
formance standard-type ships. However, when the sudden need arose for
large numbers of ships during the first and ensuing waves of expansion,
performance was dropped in favor of producibility . The Liberty ships
were based on a very simple British design that had evolved over time to
include a number of features which facilitated production. The Liberty
24

ships went even further, though, and incorporated the following design
simplifications
:
Eliminated most compound curves at the bow and stern
Square hatch corners
Simplified single deckhouse-
No weather deck camber between hatches
Straight camber from the hatches to the sides -
No emergency diesel generator
No spare anchor, reduced anchor chain length
The ships would be slow and outdated from the start, but at least they
could be built at the desired rate. The strategy was well explained in
the House Appropriations hearings in January 1941:
The design is the best that can be devised for an
emergency product to be quickly, simply, and cheap-
ly built. They will be constructed for the emer-
gency and whether they have any utility afterward
will have to be determined then. (25)
As the war grew on, however, Liberty ship construction gave way to
more complex types. Figure 2-4 shows the types of ships in construction
between 1941 and 1945, and it is clear that construction difficulty in-
creased after 1943. The Maritime Commission estimated the construction
manhours per displacement ton for each ship type as a measure of con-
struction difficulty. These estimates were 158 for tankers, 184.5 for
Liberty ships, 190.4 for standard cargo ships, 219 for Victory transport
ships, and up to 564 for the more complicated military types. This shift
to more difficult ships explains why there was almost no productivity
increase from 1943 to 1944. Given that the shipyards in 1943 were ham-
pered by inexperience and yard construction still in progress, it would
be reasonable to expect a significant productivity increase in 1944.
However, 1943 averaged 195.3 manhours per displacement ton, and that fig-







Figure 2-4. Types of ships in construction in the Maritime Commission
program. ( 26)
2.5.2 Standardization
Standardization was identified early on by the Maritime Commission
as one of the keys to a successful massive building program. It was
achieved on the large scale by building all the ships of a class in all
shipyards to the same design plans—there was no custom tailoring during
the construction process. If any modifications were desired, they were
made afterwards to the completed ship. This contrasted with the British
practice of having one design for each yard. Nationwide standardization
had 2 primary advantages. First, drawings could be easily reproduced for
utilization by other yards. Second, it enabled a much more efficient
procurement system to be enacted. Rather than have each yard purchase
the materials and machinery to build the ships, the Maritime Commission
(through the naval architectural firm of Gibbs and Cox) acted as the
26

central purchasing agent. In an atmosphere in which competition for
materials was intense and in which material suppliers were stretched well
beyond their normal capacities, maintaining central control of material
both provided a more orderly, efficient system and minimized the disrup-
tion caused by shortages. "The procurement of components could be orga-
nized in a steady, flexible flow from a number of vendors supplying in-
terchangeable articles to a number of shipyards. "( 27 )
This concept of interchangeability received considerable attention
from the Maritime Commission. The immense demand for shipbuilding compo-
nents necessitated multiple suppliers, which could easily degrade stan-
dardization. The Maritime Commission avoided this by having all the sup-
pliers modify their designs just enough so that the major components were
interchangeable. Consider boilers and soot blowers, for example. Bab-
cock and Wilcox, Combustion Engineering, and Foster-Wheeler made the
boilers for the 200 American ships of the first wave of expansion. The
shipboard boiler arrangement and the boiler components were modified from
the British design so that the parts of all 3 manufacturers were inter-
changeable. Diamond, Vulcan, and Bayer were the 3 vendors supplying the
soot blowers, and they all modified their designs enough so that any of
the 4 main components (head, element, wall box, and bearings) could be
interchanged and used with any boiler or piping system. Another good
example is the propulsion engine. The General Machinery Corporation sup-
plied the engines for the 60 British ships in the first wave. For the
200 American ships, Gibbs and Cox called together the General Machinery
Corporation and 10 other potential vendors to decide on a simple, stan-
dard design. The agreed upon design allowed for some variation from ven-
dor to vendor, but the major parts in all the variations could be used in
any of the other designs. Producibility of each of these parts also
played a major role in the engine design and was much more important than
performance.
A standard reliable product that could be built in a
minimum amount of time was what was wanted. It was
not doubted that this engine could be improved upon,
but improvements were not wanted. (28)
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Another design characteristic was the attempt to standardize vari-
ous items within each ship. For example, the number of steel plate
gauges was reduced from 75 to 27. This undoubtedly led to a sub-optimal
design from a weight and performance standpoint, but certainly simplified
supply and production.
2.5.3 Quantity Production
Standardization is intimately linked with quantity production, for
without both, neither is particularly advantageous. The two primary ad-
vantages of large quantity production were that it allowed the shipyards
to benefit from a learning curve, and it changed the economics of the
process so that assembly lines with special tooling became feasible. The
learning curve is best illustrated by the length of time it took to build
Liberty ships. The first Liberty ships in 1941 took about 250 days from
keel laying to delivery. By late 1943, the average time was 42 days.
This was partly due to better organization of the shipbuilding process,
thereby allowing higher manning levels and requiring fewer manhours per
ship, and partly due to finishing construction of the shipyards. Con-
struction time and manhours per ship are shown graphically in Fig-
ure 2-5. The average manhours per ship were more than cut in half, while
building time was cut by about four-fifths. This difference, which is
due to higher manning levels, was a result of extensive prefabrication
and will be discussed in the next section. The construction time learn-
ing curve is demonstrated even more dramatically by looking at successive
ships within a shipyard. Figure 2-6 shows the time on the ways for the
first 20 Liberty ships built in Kaiser's Portland yard and the average
for all shipyards. Also included are the manhours per ship. As can be
seen, the great majority of the improvement came in the first 4 or 5
ships, although this is exaggerated somewhat by the fact that the first
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Figure 2-5. Construction time (keel laying to delivery) and manhours per
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The learning curve is a result of workers and management doing the
same thing many times and simply getting better at it each time. The
success of the Liberty ship program "depended, first of all, at least
from an engineering standpoint, on having standardized the product.
Speed in production came from buildings the same design over and over
again with the continuity that made it possible both to learn from ex-
perience and to plan ahead. "(31) without standardization, repetition
and its advantages are diminished. This is demonstrated by the impact on
productivity of changing from constructing Liberty cargo ships to other
types. Figure 2-7 shows productivity (measured in displacement tons pro-
duced per million manhours ) on a quarterly basis in Kaiser's Portland
yard and in Calship. There was, in both these yards as well as all
others, a drop in productivity precipitated by a product change, followed
by an increase in productivity as the yards benefitted from the learning
curve on the new product. The sharp drop in mid- 1945 was due to the
winding down of the shipbuilding effort as the war came to a close and it





Figure 2-7. Impact of ship-type changes on productivity. ( 32)
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The second major advantage of quantity production, assembly lines
with special tooling, was also closely aligned with prefabrication. The
best demonstration of assembly lines in World War II shipbuilding oc-
curred inside the fabricating shops. Specialization of bays within the
shops became common practice, and each bay tended to develop assembly
line techniques to build its product. A bay that just did double bot-
toms, for example, would quickly learn the most efficient procedure for
building them and would organize itself in a manner that effectively fol-
lowed that procedure. Virtually all shipyards developed areas devoted to
building the prow and forepeak sections, and devoted other areas to any-
thing from tank tops to corrugated bulkheads. This lead to the use of
hard tooling to support the specialized functions of each assembly area.
Flame cutting torches, for example, were often mounted on- tracks that cut
the same pattern over and over again. Bethlehem Steel installed special
equipment that produced 120 Liberty ship rudders per month. In general,
however, shipyards were not mass producing ships or ship components in
the same way that Detroit was mass producing cars. Shipyard batches were
in the hundreds rather than tens of thousands, which ordinarily would
limit the investment a shipyard could reasonably make in expensive equip-
ment. Since schedule was more important than cost, though, it is likely
that some facilities investments were made which wouldn't have been made
on the basis of economic analysis alone.
2.5.4 Prefabrication
As was alluded to in the discussion of assembly lines, extensive
prefabrication was used in building World War II ships. There had been
much prefabrication in World War I shipbuilding, even to the extent of
the steel plates arriving at the shipyards already cut and drilled for
riveting (and frequently already riveted), so prefabrication was a
logical way to approach the World War II shipbuilding challenge.
Additionally, throughout the first part of the war, the number of
shipways was the limiting factor in ship production. Time on the ways
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was therefore at a premium, and this encouraged prefabrication. The
ships were built in modules away from the shipways, then quickly
assembled on the ways and launched. The average building time for all of
1943 was 35 days of fabrication and assembly, 40 days on the ways, and 10
days in outfitting. Fabrication and assembly were not complete at 35
days, but they had progressed far enough to allow rapid erection on the
ways. The relation of fabrication, assembly, and erection at Calship is
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Figure 2-8. Construction stages of Liberty ships at Calship. (33)
occur—almost simultaneously with assembly just leading erection—indi-
cates that there was probably much less in-process inventory than at
Bethlehem-Fairf ield, which is shown in Figure 2-9. Both shipyards had
almost identical time on the ways throughout the war, yet Bethlehem was
already over 80% complete with assembly prior to keel laying, whereas
Calship was only 20% complete. As shown on the graph, material was 100%
received prior to start of fabrication at Bethlehem-Fairf ield.
Prefabrication necessitated dividing the ship into modules, which
today is referred to as zone construction. Each shipyard was free to
define the module boundaries in a way best suited to that yard's crane
and storage area capacity. Bethlehem-Fairfield had large storage areas
and prefabricated many units including 22-ton innerbottom units and
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Figure 2-9. Construction stages of Liberty ships at Bethlehem-
Fairfield. (Different abscissa from Figure 2-8).
^
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deckhouse at Kaiser's Vancouver yard. The deckhouse was assembled on a
4-station assembly line, each station being at the end of a subassembly
line, then was placed on the ship after launching. South Portland,
Maine, on the other hand, had very little storage area and did not use
prefabrication extensively. Although productivity data was unavailable
for South Portland, manning data shows that the yard employed only 710
men per way, compared with Kaiser's Portland yard which employed 2400 men
per way, the highest of all yards. Conversely, Portland employed the
fewest men per ship delivered, an indication of exceptional productiv-
ity. Although part of this difference was due to more extensive back-
shift manning at Portland, it nevertheless points out a significant ad-
vantage of prefabrication—when more work is occurring away from the
actual hull, more persons can be working on the ship in less crowded and
better controlled conditions. Furthermore, prefabrication units could be
oriented in more favorable positions for welding or doing other work,
whereas the assembled ship was rather inflexible in this regard. Special
tooling was also much easier to apply in the shop than on the ship.
It is unclear from the available data how much outfitting prefab-
rication there was. Structural prefabrication was practiced extensively,
and it is safe to assume that many of the prefabricated units contained
machinery, but the extent of piping, ventilation, and other system
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installation is not known. Outfitting, though, was probably not the cri-
tical issue on those ships that it is today on naval vessels, since cargo
ships and tankers tend to be almost all structure. Some World War II
yards, nevertheless, did use an innovative outfitting technique known as
progressive outfitting. * 35) Each berth at the progressive outfitting
piers specializes in one trade, such as electrical work. While a ship is
moored at that berth, all electrical outfitting is completed. The ship
then moves to the next berth where all piping is completed, and so on.
All ships in outfitting must shift berths at the same time, so a great
deal of workload balancing is required. Outfitting was completed in an
average of ten days in 1943.
2.5.5 Technological Innovation
Welding was the one major technological innovation that was used
extensively in World War II shipbuilidng. It was considerably faster
than riveting and produced ships that were much lighter. The first all-
welded C3 ship, the Exchequer, was 600 tons lighter than other C3 ' s . In
production, welding replaced one joining method with a faster method and
enabled the use of automatic welding machines in panel assembly lines.
One aspect of welding that deserves special note is the lack of quality
workmanship that it was frequently characterized by. Quality assurance
procedures were not yet well developed, so many of the welds made on
ships were defective. This led to major structural failures in 25 mer-
chant ships, 8 of which were lost at sea. The problem was brought under
control in early 1944 by implementing some design changes and stressing
better welding practices.
2.5.6 Sense of Urgency
This section includes all of those difficult to define yet very
significant factors which were a direct result of the U.S. being at war.
Three factors stand out in their importance; worker motivation, less red
tape, and a sense of common purpose. The emotions of the war gripped
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the nation after Pearl Harbor, and many shipyard employees felt directly
responsible for the war's outcome. As a result, they simply worked
harder. The decreased red tape involved in making decisions and getting
action started allowed events to occur with speed that is almost incom-
prehensible by today's standards. For example, on March 2, 1942, during
the fifth wave of expansion, the Maritime Commission sent telegrams to
Kaiser's subsidiary companies requesting proposals for a new west coast
shipyard. Ten days later, one of the companies had a plan and a contract
to build Marinship in Sausalito, California. The yard was completed and
delivered 5 ships that same year. Finally, the sense of common purpose
was undoubtedly a factor in facilitating agreements on design compromises
between competitors.
2.6 Shipyard Design
The vast expansion of shipbuilding facilities in World War II pro-
vided the opportunity to examine the various aspects of shipyard layouts
that affected productivity. Perhaps the two most important features that
experience proved to be necessary were large areas of open space between
the ways and the fabricating shops, and a layout that facilitated a
straight flow of material. The extensive prefabrication drove the need
for considerable space at the heads of the ways. Scheduling in the ship-
yards did not have time to develop into a system where prefabricated
units were finished in the shops just in time to be erected on the ways.
Everyone was in the mode of working as fast as they could, so a
considerable in-process inventory of prefabricated units tended to
collect at the head of the ways. Yards which had not planned adequately
for this became cramped and very hampered by it. Kaiser built his first
yards with 300 to 350 feet at the head of the ways, but later found that
even that was insufficient and built his later yards with 500 feet. The
yard at Brunswick, Georgia, held the spaciousness record with 1500 feet
between the ways and the shops. In designing the material flow in the
yards, it was important to prevent loops in the flow, such as locating an
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assembly shop behind a fabricating shop. Imperfect layouts could
nevertheless be compensated for by careful planninq. Kaiser's yard at
Portland, Oregon, had just such a loop in its material flow, yet it ended
up setting the record for sustained production speed.
Prefabrication also led to the development of specialization and
production lines. In Kaiser's Swan Island yard, for example, there were
11 bays in the assembly building. Three of these fabricated corrugated
bulkheads exclusively, two did shell sections, one did tank top sections,
and five did miscellaneous bulkhead and dock sections. Production line
design involved the arrangement of the various fabrication and assembly
bays in such a manner that workpieces would move through a series of
workstations and end up at the head of the shipwav. The shipyard would
then consist of a series of these assembly lines, all converging at the
erection site. The ultimate in assembly lines was the design of the
Higgins yard in New Orleans. Andrew Higgins had been tremendously suc-
cessful producing small craft for the Navy using production line tech-
niques modeled after the automobile industry. He decided to attempt the
approach with larger ships, and in March of 1942 was awarded a contract
for shipyard construction in New Orleans and production of 200 Liberty
ships. His plan was to have 4 parallel assembly lines, 2 on each side of
the fabrication buildings. Each line was to have platforms that started
with the midship sections on them, then added sections as the platforms
moved through 1 1 stations toward the sea.
The workmen in the fabricating and assembly shops
would stay in one place doing one kind of work and
their product would be put together so as to be added
to the ship in large sections as it went by, moving
down the assembly line to the launching basin. (36)
The Higgins plan was extremely popular, not only in Louisiana but also
throughout the country. The decision to cancel the contract was there-
fore not well received and was met with everything from public uproar to
congressional investigations. From an engineering standpoint, it is
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indeed sad that the contract was cancelled. Although construction of the
yard had run into a number of unexpected difficulties, it is likely that
it would have eventually produced ships very effectively. The concept is
not unlike the extrusion construction method used today in some Scandana-
vian yards, wherein the ship is gradually pulled out of a fabrication
building as hull blocks are added on sequentially.
2.7 Summary • :
The spectacular shipbuilding accomplishments of World War II were
the result of all those items previously discussed, although it is
difficult to quantify the effect of each one individually. Both the ship
and the shipbuilding process were optimized for producibility . The ship
was optimized by making it simple and keeping to a standard design. The
process was optimized by using extensive prefabrication, welding, and
producing the ships in large quantities. Ships were built in units, and
each unit was broken down into assemblies that were produced using assem-
bly line techniques. Furthermore, shipyard design was optimized since
the new yards had the benefit of being built with high volume, rapid ship
production in mind from the very start. The designs reflected the impor-
tance of prefabrication in the large space they allocated for assembly
storage, and the importance of organized assembly line techniques in
their straight through material flow. It is very difficult to estimate
the degree to which each of these factors was responsible for the overall
success, let alone how much was due to the intangible sense of urgency.
It has been estimated, though, that multiple production alone increased
productivity by 100%. This is based on an examination of manhours per
ship, excluding the first ship in each yard (which was generally built
before the shipyard was even finished). Specifically, productivity in-
creased 93% from the second to the thirteenth ship, and another 6% from
the thirteenth to the twenty-sixth ship. This increase could be directly
attributed to the learning curve, but even that is difficult to isolate
from the other factors since it was prefabrication that organized the
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process in such a way as to have the same workers performing the same job
over and over again. Once could only speculate on how effective a learn-
ing curve would be in the absence of such a well-organized process.
The shipbuilding cost breakdown during the war was not signifi-
cantly different from what it had been previously. The cost of the aver-
age wartime ship was 41% material, 41% labor, and 18% overhead, compared
to 40, 35, and 25 before the war. These figures are not totally out of
line with shipbuilding today, although there has been a shift from labor
to material costs.
In attempting to apply the lessons of World War II today, some
significant differences arise. Several of the factors which contributed
to productivity then are simply nonexistent or even undesirable now.
First, design simplification cannot be carried to the extreme that it was
for the Liberty ships. U.S. shipbuilding today is almost all military,
and military ships demand performance. Producibility is becoming a major
concern, but will never be the overriding concern. Second, quantity pro-
duction and sense of urgency are wartime dependent. We just don't have
them in peacetime, although the use of group technology to artificially
boost production quantity will be discussed. Third, although welding
technology has advanced tremendously, so have the quality assurance re-
quirements. It's probably safe to say that welding is a more cumbersome
process today than it was in World War II (primarily due to the use of
higher strength steels). That leaves standardization and prefabrication
as the only areas that are fully within our control. These will be




NAVAL SHIP DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
3.1 The Naval Ship Design Process
The process of ship design and construction is extremely lengthy.
The lead ship of a class of destroyer-sized naval vessels requires from 5
to 10 years to design and construct, which is often preceded by 5 to 1
years of development of some of the more complex systems on board (such
as weapons and electronics ).( 37) This chapter will begin with an over-
view of the naval ship design and construction process, then will center
on the costs involved in naval shipbuilding. The intent is to delineate
the various costs and identify the major cost drivers.
Naval ship design occurs in 5 phases: feasibility studies, con-
ceptual design, preliminary design, contract design, and detailed de-
sign. The time sequence of these phases is shown in Figure 3-1 . During
the feasibility studies phase, a number of alternate configurations are
considered, and the one which will best meet the needs of the Navy is
selected based on a balance between performance and cost. Performance
requirements are firmed up and major technical risks are identified. The
chosen configuration is then developed in the conceptual design phase
enough to validate the results of the feasibility studies. Major ship
systems are selected, major technical risks are resolved, and approximate
weight and cost estimates are made. The purpose of the preliminary de-
sign phase is to integrate the ship systems and "achieve a complete engi-
neering description of an integrated ship... (and) functional definition

















Figure 3-1 . Design phases and construction for a lead ship. (39)
Contract design further refines the estimates and translates the engi-
neering definition of the ship into a biddable package for. private indus-
try. Contracts for the FFG-7 program were cost plus fixed fee for de-
tailed design, cost plus incentive fee for lead ship construction, and
fixed price for follow ship construction.
(
4°) Although this changes
every decade or so, all the design work up to this point would be done by
NAVSEA or its design agents. Frequently industry is consulted, though,
during the contract design or even preliminary design phase in order to
help incorporate producibility considerations into the design. Following
contract bids and award, the lead shipyard does the detailed design,
which consists of both system design and production of working drawings.
The detailed design serves as the basis for actually building the ship.
As shown in Figure 1, there is a considerable overlap between detailed
design and lead ship construction. This is characteristic of conven-
tional shipbuilding methods, but, as will be discussed in the next chap-
ter, is not desirable in advanced shipbuilding methods.
During ship construction, the shipyard purchases some raw mate-
rials, such as steel plate, pipes, and cabling, with which to fabricate
and assemble the ship. Other components, such as valves, pumps, and
motors, are generally purchased from vendors. Such items are called Con-
tractor Furnished Equipment (CFE). Still other components, such as most
of the weapons and electronics gear, are purchased by the government and
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given to the shipyard for installation. These items are called Govern-
ment Furnished Equipment (GFE). Anything that has a very long lead time
is generally included as GFE, since that enables the government to order
it prior to contract award.
One of the inevitable results of this lengthy design and construc-
tion procedure is a strong desire to change the design during the latter
stages of the process. The equipment which is being installed during
lead ship construction might have been developed 10 or more years prior
to that, and is very possibly already outdated. This is even more likely
as the program proceeds into follow-ship construction. If an improved
replacement has since been developed, the Navy may elect to issue a
change order. This requires the shipbuilder to modify the detailed de-
sign and construction process enough to accommodate the new equipment or
improved configuration. Change orders range from negligible to those
having a major impact on the scope or nature of some portion of the work
package. Typically, there are several thousand major change orders dur-
ing a ship construction program.
3.2 Ship Work Breakdown Structure
Currently the Navy carries out the design process on a functional,
or system, basis. The Ship Work Breakdown Structure (SWBS) is the ac-
counting code used by the Navy and its contractors to track the weight of
all physical components of the ship and the costs associated with the
ship construction. The SWBS code consists of three digits, the first of
which designates functional group; the second, subgroup; and the third,
element.
(
41 ) There are 9 major groups, and they are listed in
Table 3.1. The first 7 groups correspond to functional aspects of the
ship. Everything that is physically a permanent part of the ship is
categorized into 1 of those 7 groups. Groups 8 and 9 do not represent
physical parts of the ship and are not used for tracking weights; they
are only used for tracking the costs that are not directly attributable
to the first 7 groups. The second and third digits identify a particular
system or element within a group. Examples are listed in Table 3.2.
41





400 Command and surveillance
500 Auxiliary systems
600 Outfit and furnishings
700 Armament
800 Integration/engineering
900 Ship assembly and support services
Table 3.2. Example SWBS elements.
(
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111 Shell plating and framing
252 Propulsion control system
331 Lighting distribution
472 Passive ECM systems
521 Firemain and flushing system
612 Rails, stanchions, and lifelines
721 Missile launching system
843 Inclining experiment
991 Temporary utilities and services
3.3 Ship Acquisition Costs
Having reviewed the naval ship design process and cost accounting
procedure, it is now possible to quantify the costs involved in naval
ship construction. Specific detailed cost information is considered pro-
prietary; therefore, the cost data in this chapter is based on several
different classes of ships and is intentionally approximated. It is in-
tended to give a general idea of the comparative costs of various aspects
of ship acquisition and should not be used as a basis for more detailed
analysis. The ships involved were all non-nuclear surface ships of
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moderate size (no aircraft carriers). The figures best represent ships
with gas-turbine propulsion plants.
The actual cost to the government of a ship over its entire life-
time is its life cycle cost, which includes acquisition cost, operating
costs, maintenance costs, etc. Although acquisition cost is only about
one-quarter of the life cycle cost, (43) it receives the most attention
and will be the only cost considered here. Operating and maintenance
costs are irrelevant to the shipbuilding industrial process and are
therefore outside the scope of this thesis. Acquisition cost is essen-
tially the price tag of a new ship. The Navy uses the "P8 Cost Break-
down" to categorize acquisition costs into 9 groups. These groups, along
with their respective approximate percentages of the total acquisition
cost for a typical follow ship, are listed in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3. Follow-ship acquisition cost breakdown.
Item Description Percent
1 Plan costs 0.5
2 Basic construction 38.0
3 Change orders 2.0
4 Electronics 14.0
5 H, M, & E 2.0
6 Other costs 1 .0
7 Ordnance 30.5
8 Escalation 7.0
9 P. M. growth 5.0
Item 1, plan costs, includes the cost of producing the detailed
design plans, developing test plans and procedures, and writing technical
manuals. These costs are very significant for the lead ship of a class
(about 9% of the total), but account for only 0.5% for a follow ship.
Item 2, basic construction, includes the material, labor, and overhead
costs of purchasing raw materials and CFE, fabricating and assembling the
ship, and installing and testing all equipment and systems, including
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GFE. Item 3, change orders, is the cost attributable to disruption of
the shipbuilding process caused by Navy issued change orders. Items 4
and 7, electronics and ordnance, are GFE which together make up the
combat systems suite. Item 5, hull, mechanical, and electrical, is
noncombat systems GFE. It would be significant in a nuclear powered ship
(since it would include the nuclear power plant), but in a non-nuclear
ship it is not large and includes only a few items such as the small
boats, anchors, and some navigation equipment. Item 6, other costs, is
used to fund NAVSEA expenses, such as design agents. Item 8, escalation,
accounts for the cost impact of inflation. That impact is felt primarily
in basic construction, which typically spans several inflationary years.
Item 9, program manager growth, pays for unexpected costs associated with
GFE in the same manner that item 3 funds unexpected changes in basic
construction.
To put these costs in perspective, items 4, 5, 7, and 9 are all
GFE related and combine to make up 53.5% of the total cost. Thus, over
half the cost of a ship is completely beyond the control of the indus-
trial process of shipbuilding. The shipbuilder is responsible for the
basic construction costs, which account for 38% of the price tag, and
also indirectly affects the escalation cost, since the escalation rate is
applied primarily to basic construction. The shipbuilder, therefore, has
some degree of control over somewhat more than one-third of the total
ship acquisition cost.
The next step is to divide basic construction costs into its 3
components: material, direct labor, and overhead. The U.S. Maritime
Administration examined the cost division between material and labor/
overhead for various ship types and other industrial products. The re-
sults, which do not include profit, are listed in Table 3.4. Including
profit and using more recent data gives the basic construction cost
breakdown listed in Table 3.5.
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Steel harbor tugs 68 32
Wood fishing vessels 67 33
Marine boilers 62 38
General cargo ships 62 38
Joiner subcontractor 60 40
Naval auxiliary ship 59 41
Naval combatant ship 55 45
Naval amphibious ship 53 47
Hatch covers 52 48
Commercial buildings 52 48
Propulsion turbine/gears 39 61
Naval submarine 38 62
Naval hydrofoil 35 65









These figures are for a naval combatant ship and are only approximate.
Similar breakdowns for 18,000 dwt roll-on/roll-off freighters built in
1972 in the U.S and Japan are shown in Table 3.6. The total cost of the
Japanese vessel was only 60% that of the U.S. ships which was similar but
not identical. For both the naval and merchant ships, direct labor costs
are only a fraction of the construction price tag. The thrust of flex-
ible automation is generally considered to be reduction of direct labor
45







Material 41 .1 65.4





Overhead and profit 31 .2 19.6
100.0 ($37. 8M) 100.0 ($22. 7M)
labor costs, which represent only 20% of the basic construction cost of a
naval ship, or 7.6% of the total acquisition cost. A 50% reduction in
direct labor would therefore result in less than a 4% savings in the
total ship cost to the Navy. Other estimates have come up with similar
results. Ray Ramsey of the Naval Sea Systems Command estimated the
actual manufacturing costs of a ship to be less than 8% of the total ac-
quisition cost. (46) Clearly, there are other major issues which must
be addressed if the cost of naval ships is to be significantly reduced.
However, flexible automation can also impact material and overhead
costs. Excessive rework due to poor quality industrial processes can
significantly increase material costs, as can inefficient utilization of
raw materials due to poorly thought-out cutting plans. Overhead costs
increase when poorly planned process flow lanes cause in-process inven-
tory to pile up. Chapter 1 noted that many Japanese and European ship-
yards have significantly lower material and overhead costs than U.S.
yards, so these cost factors should not be ignored in assessing the cost
impact of flexible automation.
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3.4 Direct Labor Costs
The remainder of this chapter, however, will be devoted to direct
labor costs. For the sake of clarity, let us assume that we are analyz-
ing a ship with a direct labor cost of $100 million. This corresponds to
a total acquisition cost, of $1.32 billion, which is excessively high for
a destroyer-type ship, but it simplifies the discussion by allowing per-
centages and millions of dollars to be used interchangeably. It is a
reasonable estimate for the price of a cruiser in the not too distant
future. It is instructive to examine the nature of the work that costs
$100 million both from a craft and a system point of view. A typical
breakdown of labor costs by craft is shown in Table 3.7< Welding (along
with burning) is shown to be the number one cost driver. However, weld-
ing is done to support a wide variety of work—hull structure, founda-
tions, piping, sheetmetal, electrical conduit brackets, hull insulation
studs, etc. A simple craft breakdown does not adequately address the
issue of work content. Some additional light is shed by looking at the
cost by SWBS code. The cost breakdown for the nine major functional
groups is shown in Table 3.8. Auxiliary systems, which are primary pip-
ing and ventilation, are the major cost drivers. Hull structure is sig-
nificant as a single category, but is much smaller than the overall cost
of outfitting. This is one item which distinguishes a naval vessel from
a merchant ship. Cargo ships and tankers are predominantly structure,
whereas naval ships are packed full of piping systems, electrical sys-
tems, ventilation ducts, and other nonstructural components. Outfitting
is even more significant for submarines.
If we further divide these major functional groups into individ-
ual elements and groups of similar elements, we get a better picture of
what the real cost drivers are. Table 3.9 lists the major cost items as
well as a number of minor items of interest. Recall that these figures
best represent a gas turbine ship, which has no main steam or high pres-
sure drain system and only a minimal auxiliary steam system; a conven-
tional steamship would have even higher piping costs. Nevertheless,
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Table 3.8. Direct labor costs by SWBS for naval
combatant ship.
SWBS Group Cost ($million)
100 Hull structure 17
200 Propulsion plant 5
300 Electric plant 13
400 Command and surveillance 4
500 Auxiliary systems 18
600 Outfit and furnishings 15
700 Armament 2
800 Integration/engineering 8
900 Ship assembly and sup-
port services 18
Total 100
piping systems are still the major cost item, followed by hull structure
and electrical distribution. Painting, ventilation, foundation, and hull
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Table 3.9. Major cost items on a naval combatant ship,
Element Cost ($million)
Piping systems 15.0
Hull, decks, superstructure 11 .0

















insulation are also very expensive, each being 3% or more of the direct
labor cost. Although not specifically listed, lockers and shelves are
fairly significant, amounting to an estimated several percent. The SWBS
groups much of outfitting by compartment, making it difficult to isolate
the cost of specific types of work, such as lockers. Of the $15 million
for piping systems, 73% is for pipefitters, 16% is for welders, and 11%
is for other trades. (Pipefitter work on nonpiping systems includes
waveguides and refrigeration compressors.) A more detailed discussion of
piping systems will be reserved for Chapter 5.
To summarize, direct labor costs in basic construction amount to
$100 million in a $1.32 billion ship. Material costs for raw material
and CFE total $250 million, and shipyard overhead costs and profit come
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to about $150 million. Flexible automation has the potential to influ-
ence all of the basic construction costs, although emphasis is generally
placed on direct labor cost. Outfitting dominates direct labor costs in
naval shipbuilding, with piping systems being the single most expensive
group of systems. Pipe fabrication and subassembly will be the subject





4.1 Conventional Shipbuilding Methods
The traditional organization of shipbuilding, dating from
the days of wooden ships, was to construct the ship in
place, working on each functional system of the ship in
turn. First, the keel was laid, then the frame erected,
and so on. When the hull was nearly complete, outfitting
of the ship began. Outfitting was planned and carried out
by system, as ventilation, piping, electrical, and machin-
ery systems were installed. ' 47
)
This organization undoubtedly grew out of the systems approach
used in ship design. Ship owners think of ship performance in terms of
system performance, and they define the design requirements by system.
The ship designers, who are functionally oriented to begin with, there-
fore find it very convenient to perpetuate the systems approach in their
designs and in their own organization. The Navy's use of the SWBS, as
discussed in the previous chapter, is a good example of the systems
nature of ship design. The systems approach was passed on to the ship-
builders via the issue of plans by system. Each system had its own
drawings, and outfit drawings were generally not issued until hull con-
struction was well underway.
(
48 ) This, together with the unionized
structure of the shipbuilders, forced the utilization of a systems ap-
proach to construction.
Unfortunately, this is a very inefficient way to build ships.
Nevertheless, it persisted in the United States until recently, leading
naval architect Thomas Gillmer to write in 1975:
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Except for the brief period of mass produced cargo ships
and smaller craft during World War II in the United States,
the process of shipbuilding has been traditional, method-
ical, and conservative. In most cases it was and still is
a slow, laborious, and very expensive process. (49)
The situation, howeyer, has changed significantly since then.
Virtually every major naval shipbuilder is adopting a zone-oriented
approach to ship construction, and the results to date have been ex-
tremely good. (50) Section 4.2 will discuss zone construction and out-
fitting, as well as other modern shipbuilding techniques, in more de-
tail. The impact of these techniques on design and engineering will also
be examined. Section 4.3 will briefly discuss some unique aspects of
naval ships that will affect the utilization of modern techniques in
naval shipbuilding.
4.2 Modern Shipbuilding Methods
4.2.1 Zone Construction and Outfitting
Zone construction is based on dividing the ship into geographical
units rather than breaking it down functionally by system. In other
words, it is modular pre-fabrication, very similar to that used in World
War II. Most shipyards already apply the zone approach to hull construc-
tion. (51) The modular breakdown for the TAO (oiler) built at Avondale
Shipyards is shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1. Hull block breakdown for TAO at
Avondale Shipyards, Inc. (52)
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Zone outfitting is more difficult to implement than zone hull
construction, and shipyards are still in the process of adopting it. Its
purpose is to make outfitting an integral part of the hull construction
process—to outfit the modules before putting the modules together. "The
driving force in zone outfitting is the installation of components at
the times and under the conditions that produce the lowest overall
costs." (53) The optimum time is generally while the hull block is
still in the shop, before it is erected on the ways. The optimum
condition occurs when the block is not crowded with other workers and
when it is oriented in such a manner that workers don't have- to reach up
to weld, hang piping assemblies, etc. Frequently that calls for the
block to be upside down. Three types of outfitting are commonly defined
in the literature: on-unit, on-block, and on-board. On-unit is that
outfitting done on a pre-assembled machinery package, separate from any
ship's structure. On-block is the outfitting of structural blocks prior
to their erection on the ways. On-board is the outfitting of structural
blocks after their erection on the ways. It is still organized by zone,
but requires 30% more labor hours than on-block outfitting and 70% more
than on-unit. (54) On-board outfitting should therefore be limited to
equipment whose size, weight, or susceptibility to damage precludes
earlier outfitting, and to certain distributed systems (such as
electrical cables) that are not amenable to division at block boundaries.
Avondale Shipyards, Inc., is perhaps the leader among U.S. yards
in implementing zone outfitting. The increasing degree to which Avondale
pre-outfits hull blocks is shown in Figure 4.2. Avondale uses the term
"unit" to designate a hull block. Zone outfitting has improved Avon-
dale's schedule and cost performance dramatically. Keel laying to launch
time has decreased over 20% and launch to delivery time has decreased
over 30% on non-combatant ship construction. ( 55 ) Regarding cost, Avon-
dale was recently able to win the procurement contract for new Navy
amphibious ships (LSDs) by underbidding Lockheed by about 30%, after
Lockheed had already built the first three ships of the class. (56)























































Figure 4.2. Increased use of on-block outfitting at Avondale. ( 57)
the primary reason for their ability to bid so low and still make a
profit.
4.2.2 Process Flow Lanes
Having divided the ship into modules, it is now appropriate to




Modern construction techniques are premised on organizing the work by
process similarities. Organizing the work into process flow lanes opti-
mizes efficiency by taking full advantage of those process similarities.
A process lane is a series of fixed workstations with
permanent services (pneumatic, electrical, welding, etc.)
and appropriate tooling and jigs to produce a category of
products (subassemblies) whose fabrication and assembly
involve the application of a given sequence of production
processes or which involve a common set of manufacturing
problems. (58)
The only process lanes in shipbuilding that the author is aware of are
for structural assemblies. Avondale classifies all structural assemblies
into six categories and has a separate process lane for each category.
These six categories are listed in Table 4.1 along with the percentage of
total assemblies that each category represents for a typical tanker.
Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding off. Curved shell units
would undoubtedly constitute a much higher percentage on naval combatant
ships.
Table 4.1. Structural assembly categories at Avondale Shipyards.
(Percentages are for a typical tanker.) (59)
Category Description Percentage
1 Flat panel units 48
2 Curved shell units 5 •
3 Superstructure units 29
4 Forepeak and aft peak 10
5 Engine room innerbottoms 5
6 Special units - skegs,
rudders, etc.
5
The idea of process lanes is not new. It was used very success-
fully in World War II shipbuilding and is the basis of the assembly line
technique used widely in other industries. By dedicating equipment to be
used repetitively for similar tasks, equipment setup times are reduced.
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Since workers specialize in doing similar tasks on similar assemblies,
the learning curve is maximized. Material flow is simplified, because
the material requirements of each assembly area are relatively constant
and controllable. Material movements are thereby minimized, as was
quantitatively substantiated by Avondale's experience. Implementation of
the structural process lanes resulted in 28.4% fewer pieces of steel
material being moved per week and a total distance reduction of
23.2 miles (34. 8%). (60) The savings were significant in terms of both
transportation costs and reduction of lost material. Figures on the




The shift to zone construction and outfitting has made accuracy a
much more critical issue, since it is impossible to force-fit two pre-
fabricated hull blocks together in the same manner that a single plate or
beam can be force-fit. Accuracy control is the method of applying
statistical rigor to the establishment of realistic accuracy goals and
the development of procedures and controls to achieve those goals.
Accuracy control provides scientifically derived, written,
and realistically obtainable accuracy standards and goals.
... No longer are crucial judgements about accuracy left to
opinions and guesses. (61)
Accuracy control utilizes checks, controls, and statistical anal-
ysis to accomplish the objectives. ' 62 ) Checks simply monitor existing
processes and point out problem areas. Checks in and of themselves do
nothing to improve the product. Controls improve the existing product by
ensuring a minimum level of accuracy in all processes. However, it is
only through the use of formal statistical analysis that control deci-
sions can be optimized and future work can be significantly improved. In
other words, statistical analysis answers the question of how accurate is
accurate enough. The tolerances for each process used in making an
assembly can be set so that they are all consistent and produce the
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desired accuracy in the finished assembly. The control effort can be
focused on those specific areas that are currently inconsistent with the
overall accuracy goals and therefore offer the most benefits if improved.
The importance of accuracy control is well documented in Japan,
but it is still a fairly new concept in U.S. shipbuilding. Nevertheless,
research conducted by the University of Washington at Tacoma Boatbuilding
Company (on the construction of Navy ocean surveillance vessels) has
shown that "accuracy control is cost-effective in both the short and long
terms. "(63) The short-term benefit of reduced rework alone outweighed
the cost of collecting and analyzing the data. The long-term benefits
from optimizing the controls and possibly improving the product design
are not yet known, but are expected to be much greater than the short-
term benefits (based on experience in other industries). Less force-
fitting due to improved accuracy will have the additional benefit of
improved shock resistance—a benefit which is of considerable importance
to naval ships. (64)
4.2.4 Impact on Design and Engineering
In order for shipbuilders to be fully effective at implementing
zone construction techniques, ship designers must issue working plans
that are zone oriented. However, the ship design process will always
begin with a systems approach since that is the only practical way to
evaluate ship performance characteristics. Therefore, the design process
must include a transition from system to zone orientation. In the naval
ship design process, this would need to occur during the latter part of
detailed design. The following design phases have been suggested as the
proper sequence after contract design:
Functional design and planning
Transition design and planning
• Zone design and planning
Stage design and planning (65)
These phases are being used to some degree in several yards, although not
formally by these names.
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Functional design develops the system details to ensure that the
contract specifications are met
—
just as detailed design has been doing.
However, rather than issuing working drawings by system, each system is
spatially divided into zones during transition design, and all the system
segments in the same zone are combined in composite drawings during zone
design. Stage design and planning adds scheduling data—showing the
sequence and timing of component installation in the zone.
The impact of zone construction on design and engineering is
therefore twofold. First, it requires extensive horizontal communication
among the various design functional specialists. Structural designers,
electrical designers, ventilation designers, piping designers, and others
must work closely together as a team to optimize the arrangement of all
the systems within the zone. This teamwork provides the opportunity to
produce a much better overall design than in the past, when systems were
routed independently of one another (only giving attention to preventing
physical interference).
Second, the amount of engineering effort is increased substan-
tially, since it must both transition to zone orientation and incorporate
scheduling data. Furthermore, the engineering effort must be heavily
front-loaded. Outfitting plans cannot lag behind hull plans as they did
in conventional methods. All system functional designs must be completed
in time to support transition and zone design. Quantitatively, at
Avondale, the total engineering manhours on noncombatants increased from
350,000 to 500,000 with the adoption of zone construction and outfitting.
The additional front-loading of the engineering effort caused the average
engineering manhours per month prior to start of prefabrication to more




Group technology (GT) has been described as the "manufacturing
philosophy which identifies and exploits the underlying sameness of parts
and the manufacturing processes ."
I
67 ) It is a method of grouping parts
or assemblies together into families that share common design or manufac-
turing attributes. If the family members are similar enough from a
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manufacturing standpoint, then they can be manufactured together as
a batch, and some of the advantages of quantity production can be
achieved. Identifying design similarities is aimed primarily at reducing
the number of new designs. GT application to design will be discussed
first.
There is a natural tendency in shipbuilding and every other indus-
try to continually design new parts and assemblies for use in new pro-
ducts. Existing parts (perhaps with minor modifications) might do the
job, but the designer is not always aware of all the existing parts and
might not have an incentive to use them. "Design engineers are creative
and talented people. Being creative does not lend itself to the adoption
and continued use of mundane standards. I 68) Furthermore, the cost of
part proliferation is generally grossly underestimated. (69) However,
studies show that there are only 2,000 to 6,000 truly unique designs in
any given industry, (7°) and that the cost of designing a new part aver-
ages $1,900.( 71 ) Using GT to identify existing parts that meet a de-
sign need has been shown to reduce new part designs by an average of 5 to
10%, and in some cases as much as 40%. w2) Although shipbuilding use
of GT is just beginning, the savings in other industries have been signi-
ficant. Pitney Bowes, for example, reduced new part costs by $200,000
annually. ( 73) GT adds both the capability and the incentive to use
existing parts. By establishing families of similar parts, it becomes
feasible for the designer to search through a given family to find what
he needs (rather than having to search through all the parts); if a fami-
ly becomes excessively large, it draws attention to the design redun-
dancy.
Many parts that are dissimilar in design are nevertheless very
similar in their manufacturing processes. GT can be used to identify
these similarities by forming families based on manufacturing attributes.
This application will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 6.
GT uses a coding and classification scheme to identify the desired
similarities. Each part or assembly is described by a code, each digit
of which describes some particular aspect of the part (such as material,
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thickness, machining tolerance, surface treatment, etc.). All the parts
with the same given digit or group of digits form a family. Codes can be
designed as polycodes, monocodes, or a hybrid mixture of the two. (74)
All the digits are independent of one another in a polycode. For ex-
ample, a "3" as the fifth digit would always mean the part material is
stainless steel. In a monocode, the meaning of each digit depends on the
preceding digits. The same "3" might mean stainless steel if the third
digit were a "1", but it might mean a tolerance of _+0.001 inches if the
third digit were a "2". A hybrid code contains some dependent and some
independent digits. Most codes in use are hybrid or polycode. Several
used in shipbuilding will be discussed briefly.
Most GT applications to shipbuilding so far have been in the area
of structures, although pipe fabrication has been mentioned in the lit-
erature as another potential area. (75) Several structural codes have
been developed in Europe, including ones by personnel of the British Ship
Research Association and The University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, Scot-
land. These are both polycodes of ten and nine digit length, respec-
tively. The attributes identified by the latter code are listed in
Table 4.2.






2 Shape before forming
3 Forming
4 Holes and slots
5 Edge preparation




It is clearly a manufacturing code, since the digits primarily describe
manufacturing processes rather than design form, fit, and function.
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Some codes attempt to include both manufacturing and design attri-
butes. One such code, MULTICLASS, was developed at the Organization for
Industrial Research (OIR) in Waltham, Massachusetts.
(
77 ) The MULTI-
CLASS code has 32 digits that can take on a variety of meanings, depend-
ing on the desired application. For machined parts and sheet metal as-
semblies, 18 of the digits are defined by OIR, with the others left to
the user's discretion. Other applications, such as electronics parts, do
not yet have an established code structure. The software program for
family grouping is called MULTIGROUP and can handle whatever digits
become assigned to the code. Electric Boat is using MULTICLASS to code
all the machined and sheet metal parts used in submarines.. When coding
is finished, EB expects to have 25,000 different parts used in Groton and
18,000 different parts used in the Ouonset Point facility.
(
7Q ) This is
substantially more than the 2,000 - 6,000 different designs that are gen-
erally believed to exist. The author is unsure how much of this is due
to design redundancy and how much is due to the complex and diverse
nature of submarine design.
4.3 Applications to Naval Shipbuilding
The complex and diverse nature of submarine design is also true of
all naval combatants and is the primary feature that distinguishes them
from merchant ships. Naval combatants are multi-mission ships that
contain many complex systems, support a large crew, and operate in the
most adverse of environments. From a construction standpoint, this com-
plexity manifests itself in a much larger amount of outfitting than is
characteristic of merchant ships. Much of this outfitting is electrical,
and electrical zone outfitting is limited by the current inability to
divide electrical cables into zones. That might change as cable tech-
nology advances, but for now all shipyards pull cables after the hull
blocks are joined together (on-board outfitting).
Additionally, naval combatants generally stress performance above
all else. Although producibility is receiving increased attention, naval
combatants will always contain performance features that make them more
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difficult to build. A higher percentage of curved structural panels,
tighter quality assurance standards, and shock hardening requirements are
but three of many examples. The Navy uses military standards and speci-
fications to ensure that the desired performance is achieved. While many
milspecs are necessary, commercial standards should be relied on whenever
possible. A conversion to commercial standards is currently underway as
part of the milspec improvement program.
Closely related to complexity and performance is the extensive
system testing that must be done on naval ships. While some hydrostatic
tests and equipment check-outs can be accomplished on-block, system
operational tests can only be done on-board. Tests that could be af-
fected by the minor changes in hull shape that occur when the ship be-
comes waterborne, such as combat systems alignment, must be done after
launching.
Finally, one aspect of the naval ship design process that can have
a significant effect on construction is the large number of change or-
ders. As explained in the previous chapter, change orders are used to
incorporate new technology and other improvements into a ship already
being built. The shift to zone outfitting and the front-loaded design
and engineering effort will exacerbate the disruption caused by change
orders. The Navy will have to consider that increased level of disrup-
tion in future decisions, and should make every attempt to minimize the
number and scope of change orders.
These naval combatant features make the application of modern
shipbuilding techniques more challenging, but (with the exception of
change orders) no less rewarding. In fact, the increased level of out-
fitting should make the savings from zone outfitting even more signifi-
cant than for merchant ships, although cable pulling will continue to be
a hindrance for the foreseeable future. Zone hull construction is al-
ready being practiced by all naval shipbuilders, and the degree of zone
outfitting is steadily improving. The hull block breakdown for the FFG-7
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PIPING SYSTEM DESIGN AND FABRICATION
In Chapter 3, it was shown that shipboard piping systems are one
of the major cost drivers in naval ship construction. While much empha-
sis has been placed on modern hull construction techniques in the last
decade, similar attention is just now being given to modern outfitting
techniques. Piping system work can be broadly classified into three
categories: shop fabrication, installation, and system testing.
On-board system testing (after complete installation) accounts for only
about 6 percent of the pipe shop's manhours on any given system and will
not receive further analysis here. The focus of this and ensuing
chapters will be on shop fabrication, although installation is an
inseparable consideration. Present manhour accounting methods make it
difficult to compare the labor expenditures for fabrication versus
installation. It is known that roughly one third of the piping system
manhours on a moderately sized naval combatant ship is spent on
assemblies that are installed prior to block erection on the ways. The
other two-thirds (minus 6 percent for testing) are spent on assemblies
that are installed on the ways or after launching. The breakdown of
manhours between fabrication work and installation work, however, is very
difficult to extract from available data.
This chapter will discuss piping system design requirements, naval
shipboard piping systems, and pipe shop fabrication procedures. The next




5. 1 Piping System Design Requirements and Procedures
Piping system design follows the overall ship design procedure
that was outlined in chapter three. The contract design plan includes
major arrangement diagrams and system specifications (temperature, pres-
sure, flow rate, etc.)'. System materials and sizes might or might not be
specified by the contract design plan. The lead shipyard then makes the
detailed pipe design plan by connecting the machinery, in such a way that
the system specifications are met. A modern shipyard will normally have
a design division and production engineering division. Although the pre-
cise division of responsibilities between the two will vary from yard to
yard, the following discussion properly delineates the procedures and
thought processes involved in making the detailed design plan.
The design division selects the type and size of pipe and decides
how it will run through the ship, as well as locating valves, strainers,
and other functional components (if these weren't already specified by
the contract plans)
.
In designing the system, the design division is guided by the sys-
tem specifications and applicable milstandards . The actual path of the
pipe will be based on arrangement considerations and the desire to mini-
mize the amount of material used. The production engineering division
then adds the fabrication components (couplings, elbows, tees, etc.) and
decides how the system will be divided up into assemblies and subassem-
blies. Production engineering's objective is to incorporate producibil-
ity considerations, thereby minimizing labor hours and material costs
involved in fabrication and installation. They might also recommend
changes to the piping route, if necessary, to incorporate producibility
features into the subassembly fabrication. The plans then go back to
design for final approval. In the actual design process, there would be
considerable interaction between design and production engineering, and
the plans might go back and forth a number of times before reaching final
approval. Pipe detailers then make the working plans which the shop uses
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to actually do the work. Working diagrams for three FFG-7 class patrol
frigate firemain and flushing system assemblies are included in Ap-
pendix A.
The producibility considerations taken by production engineering
generally concern either subassembly boundaries or subassembly fabrica-
tion details. Subassembly boundaries are determined by taking into con-
sideration subassembly size and weight, shipboard joint accessibility,
shipboard fit-up tolerances, and overall ease of fabrication. As a rule,
it is easier to fabricate in the shop than on the ship, so overall ease
of fabrication will generally favor larger subassemblies, thereby leaving
fewer joints to be made up on board or on block. Size and weight are
limited, however, by installation considerations. For installation on
board, each subassembly must be able to fit through the doors and hatches
and should be light enough to be easily handled without rigging equip-
ment. The limitations for on-block installation are not as strict, since
accessibility into the space is much easier. Pre-outfitting is therefore
more efficient not only for the outfitting installation, but also by al-
lowing more shop fabrication. Given the general size constraints, the
specific boundaries are located based on joint accessibility and toler-
ance fit up. Joint accessibility simply requires that joints which are
designated to be made up on board/block must be accessible. This is par-
ticularly applicable to welded joints, since locating the joint too close
to a bulkhead, pipe, or other interference would hinder a welder's abil-
ity to make a sound weld.
Piping system accuracy control is difficult since it interacts
with structural accuracy control. It not only depends on distortions and
deviations introduced during the pipe assembly fabrication, but also is
subject to the deviations in structure and equipment location which in-
terface with the piping systems. Consequently, significant allowance is
made for fit-up problems during installation. Joints other than butt
welds and flanges have some axial flexibility inherent in their design,
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so they can be used to compensate for one-dimensional inaccuracies. Ori-
enting boundary joints at right-angles gives fit-up flexibility in two
dimensions. Another technique that allows for fit-up problems is the
practice of specifying certain joints to be only tack welded prior to
installation. Rather than helping the fit up, this technique merely
minimizes the amount of rework necessary if fit up is not possible, since
only a tack weld must be ground out and redone. It has the unfortunate
effect of moving the welding of that joint, even for a successful fit up,
from the shop to the ship or block. One shipyard building noncombatants
estimated that as many as 15% of the joints leave the shop in the tack
welded condition. Similar statistics on combatants were unavailable.
The second concern of production engineering is the fabrication
details of each subassembly. Perhaps the primary consideration is that
bends are preferable to elbows. From a production standpoint, one bend
is much easier than two welds or brazes. From a design standpoint, bends
are less disruptive of flow. From a material standpoint, elbows cost
money. Whenever possible, therefore, the subassembly should be designed
to accommodate a bend. Accordingly, multiple bends on the same pipe
piece must be separated by a distance adequate to allow the bending ma-
chine to make both bends. That distance varies with pipe size and bend
angle, but is on the order of a half foot for right angle bends in a
two-inch pipe. If shipboard arrangement constraints don't permit the
separation, elbows would have to be used. When fittings must be used,
whether they be elbows, couplings, or whatever, every effort should be
made to use standard fittings. Designing Y joints with unique angles,
for instance, should be avoided. This is largely a function of the orig-
inal pipe route and pipe selection made by the design division. Selec-
tion of standard pipe sizes and joint designs which can utilize standard
fittings is important and must be done by the design division at the very
start of the design process.
Pipe material selection is determined primarily by the nature of
the fluid the pipe will be carrying, with corrosion resistance being the
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material parameter of major interest. The flow rate, fluid temperature,
and fluid pressure then determine the pipe size and fabrication proce-
dures. The applicable military standard for piping fabrication welding
and inspection is MIL-STD-278D (SHIPS), dated 26 January 1970. It de-
fines four classes of piping based on temperature and pressure; these are
listed in Table 5.1. P-3 is strictly brazed piping. The other classes
are welded, but all four can also contain mechanical joints.
Table 5.1. Piping classes on naval ships. (79)






_> 300 or T _> 650
P < 300 and T < 650
any pressure, T <_ 425 (brazed pipe)
P > 50 psi and T < -20
In addition to the pressure and temperature criteria, P-1 includes any
piping used for conveying lethal gases or liquids. Halon is included in
this category, but freon is not. P-LT is not used for any of the systems
that will be discussed in this thesis, so it will not receive further
attention. P-1, P-2, and P-3 piping are commonly found on all naval
vessels. The welding and inspection requirements for P-1- piping are
predictably the strictest and will be discussed in more detail later in
this chapter.
Shipboard piping systems can generally be categorized as carrying
salt water, fresh water, fuel oil, lube oil, hydraulic oil, compressed
gas, or steam. Oil and steam systems are normally composed of ferrous
materials, fresh water is copper, and salt water is copper nickel. Steam
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systems, which are extensive on nuclear and boiler type ships, are almost
nonexistent on the newer gas turbine ships. Table 5.2 lists the major
shipyard-installed piping systems on the FFG-7 class of patrol frigates.
Also listed are the fluid or fluids carried by each system, the primary
piping materials used in each system, and the total length of piping in
each system. The length is given in feet and includes all piping down to
0.25 inches ips . Some shipboard systems, such as missile hydraulics, are
not included because the work was subcontracted. The total length of
piping is 86,619 ft. Pipe length as a function of diameter is listed in
Table 5.3 and shown graphically for groups of diameters in Figure 5-1.
Statistical breakdown of naval piping system components such as valves
and fittings are not readily available. Although the statistics have
been gathered, the shipyards are reluctant to release them for proprie-
tary reasons.
The pipe diameters listed in Table 5.3 and shown in Figure 5-1 are
not the actual internal or external diameters, but rather the Interna-
tional Pipe Standard (IPS). Ferrous pipe sizes are normally classified
by their IPS number (also commonly referred to as iron pipe size or nomi-
nal pipe size) and schedule number. Numerically, the schedule number is
approximately equal to 1000 times the service pressure divided by the
allowable stress. It is a measure of the wall thickness of the pipe.
Schedule No. ~ 1000 x _
S
P = service pressure (psi)
S = allowable stress (psi)
Standard commercial steel pipes come in a variety of schedules from 5 to
160 and three other wall thickness designations: standard, extra strong,
and extra-extra strong. Standard and extra stong are almost identical
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Table 5.2. FFG-7 piping systems (80)
Primary Total Pipe
System Fluid (s) Material(s) Length (ft)
AC and condensate drain FW Cu 6031
Refrigeration FW Cu 654
Magazine sprinkler FW Al 2056
Electronics cooling FW Cu, SS 3345
Potable water FW Cu •7561
Waste heat circulating FW Cu, CuNi 1111
Scupper and deck drains FW, SW Al 460
Plumbing drains FW, SW Cu, CuNi 9235
Distilling plant FW, SW CuNi 466
Drainage and ballast FW, SW CuNi, S 31 12
Salt water cooling SW CuNi 2904
Firemain and flushing SW CuNi 4895
Water washdown SW CuNi , SS 2692
Waste/oily water SW CuNi 4729
Fuel oil service FO SS 592
Diesel generator fuel FO s 1365
Fuel fill and transfer FO s, ss 5960
JP-5 FO CuNi 1305
Lube oil fill, transfer,
purify LO S 2284
Propeller hydraulics HO S 373
Boat handling hydraulics HO SS 155
Fin stabilizer hydraulics HO SS 174
Gas turbine starting air CG SS 354
Control air CG Cu 4154
HP, LP air CG Cu, CuNi, SS
Nitrogen CG Cu 119
Shore steam steam Cu 543
Diesel exhaust exhaust SS 367
Incinerator exhaust exhaust SS 43
Gauge piping misc SS, S, Cu 3843
Halon/AFFF halon/foam S, CuNi 6343
Voice tubes ___ Brass 81
Total: 86,619
FW = Fresh water Cu = Copper
SW = Salt water CuNi = Copper-Nickel
FO = Fuel oil Al = Aluminum
LO = Lube oi
1
S = Steel
HO = Hydraulic oil SS = Stainless steel




























Figure 5-1. Total pipe length vs diameter on FFG-7.
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Table 5.3. Pipe length vs diameter on FFG-7.
Diameter (in) Length (ft) Diameter Length
0.125 421 - 2.500 4,937
0.250 ' 13,729 2.625 "12
0.375 5,089 3.000 4,515
0.500 9,904 3.125 37
0.625 45 3.500 .92
0.750 7,359 3.625 47
0.875 116 4.00 4,696
1 .000 6,563 5.00 1,123
1 .125 119 5.50 10-
1 .250 7,364 6.00 730
1.320 506 6.60 10
1 .375 75 8.00 1 ,018
1.500 8,651 10.00 113
1.700 545 14.00 136
2.000 8,465 16.00 192
Total: 86,619
to Schedule 40 and Schedule 80, respectively. Table 5.4 lists the wall
thickness in inches for all the schedules of steel pipe commercially
available. Sixteen inches is the largest pipe used on most naval ships.
Schedule numbers followed by an "s" are commonly available in stainless
steel. For pipes larger than 12 inch ips, the size designates the actual
outer diameter of the pipe. Actual thickness may be as much as 12.5%
below the nominal thickness due to mill tolerance. Copper and brass
pipes use a similar designation scheme, but commonly come in only regular
or extra strong rather than the wide range of schedules. A list of the
outer and inner diameters for these is provided in Table 5.5. Strengths
other than regular and extra strong are specified by wall thickness
rather than schedule number.
It is obvious that a number of different codes and standards cover
piping systems. The major commercial codes are the ASME Boiler and Pres-
sure Vessel Code and the ASA Code for pressure piping. As previously
mentioned, MIL-STD-278D (SHIPS) is the applicable military standard for
pipe welding and inspection, and a number of additional military stan-
dards cover other aspects of piping systems, such as material selection.
72
































































































































































































































































































































































42 OO 42.0 .... 0473 0400


















































































5.2 Piping System Fabrication Processes
This section will describe the major operations that a pipe shop
performs in the fabrication of piping assemblies.
(1) Cutting. Pipes are generally marked for cutting with a steel
tape measure. Tolerances are not well-defined, although
1/8 inch seems to be the usual shop practice. Frequently
pipe is left intentionally long with the idea that more can
always be cut off later if necessary. Cutting- is accom-
plished either with heat or mechanically. The simplest heat
method is an oxy-acetylenc torch; the torch is held station-
ary while the pipe rotates. The torch can also be angled to
give the end of the pipe an appropriate bevel, although it
must still be further machined or ground. Generally 1/8 inch
cutting allowance is added to the marked length of a pipe
that will be flame cut. Plasma cutting is the other major
heat method and is identical except that uses a plasma arc
rather than a flame. Mechanical cutting methods include band
saws, rotary blade saws, and hand-held cutters. The hand-
held cutters are essentially just c-clamps with a rotary
blade, similar to a can opener blade, and come in a wide
range of sizes capable of cutting copper pipe up to six
inches in diameter. At one yard, all copper pipe less than
three feet in length is cut by hand; longer lengths are cut
on a saw. Saws must be followed by machining or grinding if
a bevel is required for end prep. Some yards do beveling on
a machine that works very much like a pencil sharpener; other
yards do almost all beveling by hand grinding. The inside of
the pipe must also be cleaned up after burning or cutting,
either using a reamer or hand file to remove metal and de-
bris. One yard is installing "clamshell" cutters that make
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the cut with no length allowance required and bevel both
sides of the cut.
(2) Bending. Although modern fabrication techniques favor delay-
ing bending until later in the fabrication process, bending
generally follows immediately after cutting and beveling.
Bending can be done either hot or cold, but "almost all bend-
ing done in a shipyard for surface ship construction is cold
bending. Pipes in excess of a 10-inch diameter are generally
hot bent, but shipyards usually use elbows for anything above
8 inches. Hot bending involves filling the pipe with sand
(to minimize thinning and ovality) and heating "the pipe to
1900°F (for ferrous materials). The pipe is then placed on a
pin table where it is forced into the desired shape and al-
lowed to cool. Cold bending is much faster and is therefore
the method of choice if the shipyard has the proper equip-
ment. Rotary-type bending machines are commonly used in all
shipyards for cold bending pipe up to 8 inches in diameter.
Cold bending larger pipe is possible (and is commonly done up
to 12 inches in diameter in Europe), but the small amount of
work on pipe that large in naval shipbuilding has made it
economically undesirable to invest in rotary benders that
large. Rotary benders form the pipe around a circular die
while the inside of the pipe is supported by a mandrel. A
short section of pipe (about four inches for a two-inch pipe)
immediately downstream of the die is held firmly by a clamp
lock and is forced around with the die as the die rotates to
make the bend. The clamp lock is one aspect of current bend-
ing machine design that necessitates a finite distance be-
tween bends on the same pipe.
Mandrels come in a variety of designs, as shown in
Figure 5-2. The mandrel must fit snugly; consequently,






Figure 5-2. Different mandrels for pipe bending.
(
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standard pipe diameter, but also for each wall thickness at
each diameter. Outer diameter is the only pipe dimension
that matters for the die. Dies are available for all stand-
ard pipe sizes and a range of bend radii. Five pipe diam-
eters is the most common commercial bend radius, although
three diameters is very common in naval piping systems.
Radii as small as two pipe diameters are produced by some
shipyard benders. Ferrous pipe must be normalized after a
2-D bend; copper, copper-nickel, and aluminum pipe should be
annealed prior to bending. The bending machine operator uses
his experience and judgement to determine how much to over-
bend the pipe in order to compensate for springback. Several
yards have automated pipe benders with programmed advance,
bend angle, and roll angle. There is no automatic compensa-
tion for springback in these machines; the operator has to
input a slightly larger bend angle than desired.
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The mandrels of rotary benders are oiled to allow free
slippage along the inner pipe surface. Immediately after
bending, the oil is removed from the inside of the pipe by
dipping it in a caustic solution, then rinsing in hot water.
(3) Fit up. The first stage of assembly is fit up, during which
all the components are brought into correct position and
alignment, then held in place by tack welds or clamps. Al-
most without exception, fit up is done manually, without the
aid of jigs or fixtures. Small components are fit up entire-
ly by hand by one or two workers, while larger components
might require the use of a vise or chainfall. The Piping
Handbook outlines the normal commercial procedure:
In making up subassemblies, the usual proce-
dure is to set up the largest component,
either on adjustable support "horses" or on a
level-top "layout" table, with its longitudi-
nal axis in a horizontal plane. The longi-
tudinal axis and one end of the member are
then used as baselines to which the locating
dimensions and setting of the smaller parts
can be referred, using a rule, steel tape,
hand level, squares, straightedge, or bevel
protractor as required.
Normally, in shop fabrication, an end-to-end
tolerance of ±1/8 inch is considered the max-
imum that is acceptable. However, more- rigid







No adjustable supports were observed being used for fit up in
any of the shipyards the author visited. The alignment of
large components in at least one yard is routinely done with
chainfalls, ropes, and wooden blocks and wedges. In the
particular case observed, the workers were having a fair
amount of difficulty bringing all the pieces into proper
alignment, but the supervisor claimed that minor differences
between the same assembly in two ships of the same class make
fixtures uneconomical. Regardless of how it is accomplished,
accurate fit up is critical, since poorly done fit ups are a
major cause of weld defects. Weld shrinkage. is generally
negligible in socket and fillet welds, but longitudinal
shrinkage in butt welds is a factor and allowance should be
made for it during fit up. For Schedule 40 and Schedule 80
carbon or low-alloy steel piping, shrinkage is typically
one-half the root spacing after tack welding. '85)
Small and moderate sized fit ups are accomplished either by a
pipefitter or a pipefitter and a welder. Shipyard pipe shops
generally have a separate area designated for fit up, then
move the tack-welded assembly to the welding area for produc-
tion welding. Brazed pipe also has a separate fit-up area,
where the pipe ends are sanded, flux is applied, and the
joints are assembled. For assemblies with many brazed
joints, the joints are fit up and brazed sequentially, either
individually or in groups of two (or three at most). For
example, two joints would be fit up, then the assembly would
be taken to the brazing station for brazing, then taken back
to the fit-up area where the next one or two joints would be
fit up. Fitting up all the joints at once, then brazing them
all, is not currently considered practical because the joints
do not hold themselves together (as tack-welded joints do).
Clamps would have to be used, and unless special clamps were
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designed for the purpose, they could interfere with securing
and brazing of assemblies with multiple joints in close prox-
imity.
For both brazing and welding, the actual physical fit up is
either preceded by or includes any remaining end preparation
that needs to be done. Bevels might be made during or im-
mediately after cutting, but last minute cleaning or grinding
of the pipe end is frequently required. In some cases,
beveling is delayed until fit up or adjusted during fit up to
obtain the proper root spacing. In still other cases, excess
pipe was included during cutting, and the excess must be
removed during fit up. Statistics on the frequency of each
type of fit-up problem were unavailable, but it appears to be
a fertile area for formal accuracy control analysis.
(4) Welding/Brazing. Shipyards routinely employ shielded metal
arc (stick), gas tungsten arc (GTA), and gas metal arc (GMA)
welding, although the frequency of use of each varies greatly
from yard to yard. Stick welding is generally used only on
carbon steel pipe, but it is seldom if ever used on the root
pass. GTA welding, more commonly referred to as TIG
(tungsten inert gas), is used on the root pass of most steel
piping, since it does not run the risk of drop through that
stick welding does. Drop through is a condition of excessive
penetration in which the molten metal from the weld pool
enters the pipe interior and solidifies, forming an irregular
surface. It is particularly important to avoid drop through
in lube oil systems, where a solidified globule of weld metal
could conceivably survive the system flush, then break off
during later service, causing considerable equipment damage
(or at least considerable excitement, if found in a lube oil
filter). Stainless steel pipe is generally welded with GTA
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for the first two passes, then GMA for the remainder of the
weld. GMA is also used for welding aluminum pipe.
Copper-nickel can be either welded with GMA or brazed,
although the trend is away from brazing. Heli-arc is a
process very similar to GMA; the distinction is that heli-arc
welding melts a puddle, then feeds the wire into the molten
puddle, whereas GMA melts the puddle and the wire, and the
molten wire either sprays or drops into the puddle. Heli-arc
generally gives a smoother finish and spatters less; it can
be used in any application currently being done by GMA.
Some shipyards are moving toward automated or
semi-automated welding procedures. In a typical
semi -automated welding apparatus, the pipe is set in a
holding device that rotates the pipe while the welding torch
remains stationary. The pipe is held in place by three or
more radial clamps, much as a drill bit is held in place by
the chuck of the drill. The equipment can generally handle
only straight pipe pieces; therefore, welding should be done
prior to bending on assemblies containing both bends and
welds. Post weld heat treatment is required on certain alloy
steels, such as the chrome molybdenum steel used in main
steam systems. On the gas turbine ships currently being
built, though, there are no pipes requiring post weld heat
treatment.
Brazing is used on all copper pipe and some copper
alloys. Most brazing is done by flame; induction brazing is
not approved for use on most naval systems. Brazing is done
at a large table outfitted with suction ventilators and vises
for holding the pipes while brazing. Rotating pedestals are
frequently used for short pieces that are stable vertically.
The workpiece stands on the pedestal and rotates, thereby




(5) Testing and inspection. Completed joints and assemblies can
be tested. by a number of methods. Nondestructive testing
(NDT) includes radiography testing (RT), magnetic particle
testing (MT), liquid penetrant testing (PT), ultrasonic test-
ing (UT), and eddy current testing (ET) . These tests are
performed according to the procedures outlined in MIL-STD-
271 . Visual inspection and hydrostatic testing complete the
list of available quality assurance methods. Visual inspec-
tion checks the soundness of the weld or braze and is done
either formally or informally on every joint. RT uses X-rays
to detect weld root defects and internal discontinuities in
the weld or base metal. MT exploits the change in magnetic
field that results from near surface discontinuities such as
cracks, seams, laminations, porosity, and lack of fusion or
penetration. A large current is passed through the weld, and
iron particles are sprinkled on the surface to detect the
magnetic flux lines and possible disruptions due to weld
defects. MT can be used only on ferromagnetic materials. PT
checks for surface defects with a dye that penetrates into
those defects, then is brought back to the visible surface by
a "developer." The developer is sprayed onto the surface
after the dye has been applied and wiped away from all smooth
surface areas. UT sends ultrasonic waves into the metal, and
locates defects by their reflection of those waves. UT can
also be used to check wall thickness, since the time of re-
turn for the waves is proportional to the distance to the
reflection boundary (which in this case would be the pipe
inner wall). In naval piping systems, UT is used almost
exclusively to check for adequate bonding in brazed joints.
ET, like MT, detects defects by the changes they create in
magnetic fields. However, in ET an applied primary magnetic
field induces eddy current in the pipe, which in turn induces
a secondary magnetic field that shows the disruptions due to
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defects. ET is used almost exclusively to detect defects in
heat exchanger tube bundles, since the primary magnetic field
can be applied by an internal probe that is pushed through
the pipes. Hydrostatic testing can either be done on each
pipe assembly in the shop ( if joints in- the assembly require
it) or on larger sections of the system after shipboard in-
stallation. Welds must be strength tested by bringing the
pressure up to as much as 150% of the system design pres-
sure. After all welds have been verified, the entire system
must be tested for tightness of mechanical joints at the sys-
tem design pressure. All further use of the term "hydro-
static test" in this thesis will refer to the weld strength
test.
The requirements for applying each test are specified in
MIL-STD-278d (SHIPS). Table 5.6 summarizes the NDT require-
ments for P-1 and P-2 piping. P-3 piping (brazed) is covered
by NAVSHIPS 0900-001-7000, which requires UT inspection of
certain critical joints. The testing requirements for P-LT
piping are generally the same as those for P-1 piping. There
are a number of exceptions to Table 5.6, and they are gen-
erally specified on the drawings.
(6) Surface treatment. Post weld surface treatments include
cleaning, painting, and galvanizing. Brazed pipe must always
be dipped in acid after brazing in order to remove the flux.
Steel pipes requiring post weld cleaning are also soaked
briefly in acid, a process referred to as pickling. Sul-
furic
,
hydrochloric , or phosphoric acid is the cleaning
agent, and an inhibitor is added to minimize attack on the
metal. The process is concluded by adequate rinsing in hot
water (above 140°F). Another common cleaning process is the
caustic solution dip that is used for removing the bending
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Table 5.6. Welded pipe joint inspection requirements .
(
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(1) MT/PT shall be performed only when post weld heat treatment is
required and shall be done after heat treatment. When 360° RT
is to be performed, MT/PT may be omitted.
(2) RT is only required if working pressure exceeds 575 psi. For
575 psi and below, MT or PT is sufficient.
oil. At least one major shipyard does not have pickling facil-
ities and uses the caustic solution not only for oil removal,
but also for final cleaning when necessary. If surface oxides
must be removed, that is done with shot blasting prior to
fabrication. Acid dip is used only for flux removal after
brazing. Assemblies that absolutely must be pickled are sent
to a vendor. Other shipyards have their own pickling tanks.
Cleaning requirements are a function of the shipboard system
into which the assembly will be installed. In general, P-1
piping and oil system assemblies must be cleaned prior to
installation. Completed assemblies which include functional
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components such as values, however, are not dipped in cleaning
solutions. In such cases, the pipe would be thoroughly cleaned
before fabrication, then, if system cleanliness requirements
necessitated it, the completed assembly would be flushed prior
to installation. .
Painting is done in the shipyard, but outside of the pipe
shop. Assemblies which require painting are fabricated a few
days earlier to allow time for it, but there is no direct pipe
shop involvement. Galvanizing in most shipyards is subcon-
tracted to a vendor. The completed pipe assembly is shipped to
the vendor and returned in a normal time frame of two weeks.
Galvanizing, however, is rarely done.
(7) Other processes. Two other processes, threading and drilling,
are performed on piping assemblies on an occasional basis.
Threading is done to some aluminum and brass pipes when low
pressure union joints are called for. Drilling is performed
when a small branch is desired without a tee fitting. Both
threading and drilling are simple operations that require only
minimal setup time.
(8) Final assembly. In addition to welded and brazed joints, many
assemblies leave the shop with mechanical joints (primarily
flanges). In copper assemblies, these would almost always be
made up after all brazing is completed. In welded assemblies,
the mechanical joints are frequently made up prior to welding,
particularly if the mechanical joint spacing influences the
welded joint fit up.
During the entire fabrication process, the majority of trans-
port within the shop is done by hand. Most assemblies are
light enough to be carried by the worker to the next work-
station. Heavier assemblies (which are predominantly ferrous)
are transported on a pallet by forklift. Numerous cranes are





PIPE CODING AND CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
The fundamentals of group technology were outlined in Chapter 4.
The objective of this chapter is to examine the possible applications of
group technology to piping system fabrication, select the desired appli-
cations, and develop a coding and classification scheme for those appli-
cations. Existing schemes will also be analyzed.
6.1 Group Technology Applications to Piping
The application of GT to piping system fabrication is not unlike
its application to other manufactured items in that the objectives can be
classified into five major areas:
( 1 ) Design recall
(2) Development of manufacturing cells
(3) Computer-aided process planning
(4) Workload balancing
(5) Work content estimating
Two other areas that do not fit within the strictest definitions of group
technology but which could be useful outputs of coding schemes are:





Even a modestly sized naval combatant has over 10,000 pipe assem-
blies. It is undoubtedly true that many of these assemblies either are
or could be very similar in design. Furthermore, if all of the subassem-
blies were considered separately from- their respective assemblies, it is
possible that many would be identical. For the sake of clarity, an as-
sembly will be defined here to mean any fabricated group of pipes,
valves, fittings, and other components that is to be installed on-board,
on-block, or on-unit without further fabrication. It could be as simple
as a single piece of straight pipe or extremely complicated, with many
pipes and components arranged in a complex configuration. . A subassembly
is simply a building block of a more complicated assembly. The distinc-
tion is somewhat grey and depends only on whether or not it will be in-
stalled as is, without further fabrication. Although "assembly" implies
some degree of complexity, a simple assembly could involve less work than
the subassemblies of a more complex assembly.
Piping assemblies are basically designed individually and from
scratch, with the designer's personal experience providing the only means
of design recall and standardization. In some cases shipyard practice
has led to the development of standard designs for similar shipboard con-
figurations, but there is not a systematic method for identifying all the
similar configurations that exist on ships. It is probable that many of
the assemblies could be adapted from an existing design used elsewhere in
the ship or even in a previous class of ships. Finding a similar exist-
ing design, however, would be an enormous task under current design pro-
cedures. A coding scheme that adequately described the form, fit, and
function of piping assemblies would allow the designer to quickly and
easily locate similar existing assemblies. However, piping assemblies,
unlike machined parts, can grow like ten-headed beasts. To adequately
describe the form, fit, and function of an assembly with several valves,
several flanges, and branches coming off at various angles would be be-
yond the capacity of a reasonably sized coding scheme. Design recall,
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therefore, might be feasible only for subassemblies and simple assem-
blies. Shipboard piping systems must be routed in rather unique paths
because of arrangement constraints, and assemblies reflect this in their
complexity. Previously designed subassemblies (or simple assemblies),
however, could be joined together to make complex and very unique
assemblies.
6.1.2 Development of Manufacturing Cells
This application actually embodies a number of coding and classi-
fication uses. It is the culmination of a series of manufacturing appli-
cations based on grouping the assemblies into families of similar fabri-
cation requirements. In its simplest form, GT can be used to form fami-
lies based on equipment setup requirements, then manufacture family
members as a batch. Similar operations are thereby performed together,
and time is not wasted in switching from one operation with one setup to
another operation with a different setup, then back again to the original
operation. Reduction in setup time, therefore, is the most fundamental
goal of work cell development, and it is achieved merely by sequencing
(or batching) the shop work so as to manufacture family members to-
gether. If similar assemblies are to be manufactured using the same
equipment setup, then it also makes sense to use the same workers, who
thereby specialize in that family and benefit from the learning curve.
The next level of advancement is the development of jigs and fixtures for
a particular family. These "permanent setups" become economically advan-
tageous when sufficient products are identified as being in the same fam-
ily. This implies, of course, that fixture requirements are identified
in the code and used as a basis for family groupings. The final level of
advancement is the development of the work cells themselves. If produc-
tion volume is sufficient to justify it, then groups of machines can be
dedicated to manufacturing only certain families of products. All the
machines, jigs, and fixtures dedicated to the manufacture of a particular
product family can be located physically together to form a physical work
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cell. If the dedicated equipment maintains its position in a functional
shop layout, then it is a virtual work cell. A physical cell has the
advantage of less transport time. "Process flow lane" is' a phrase used
interchangeably with work cell, although the former implies a physical
arrangement that is spread out in a somewhat linear fashion rather than
clustered together.
While none of these applications (batching, specialization, fix-
turing, and cell development) is necessarily dependent on the formal
development of a GT coding and classification scheme, a code can provide
a very convenient and thorough means of identifying product families.
And while all shops practice these applications to some. degree, GT clas-
sification families provide the basis for the introduction of rigorous
economic analysis into shop operations. For example, sequencing all work
of a given nature into a given time frame will certainly reduce setup
time, but it will increase in-process inventory since it may require work
on some assemblies to be done well ahead of the installation schedule.
Balancing competing objectives in a manner that optimizes the overall
shop operation requires more than the gut feel of the shop head; it re-
quires a formal analysis for which GT can provide the basis. Family
grouping into work cells is another economic issue. For shops producing
a low volume of dissimilar products, the family sizes might be too small
to justify any work cells. Even for large volumes of similar products,
certain families will remain outside the product range covered by work
cells. A typical shop performance curve as a function of the number of
work cells might look like that shown in Figure 6-1 . The exact shape of
the curve will vary with product family breakdown, output volume, and
cell design, and should be determined by rigorous analysis.
In applying all of this to piping fabrication, a good place to
start is with the identification of pipe shop equipment setup times. The
following discussion is based on equipment currently in use or being pro-
cured for use in several shipyards visited by the author. Recall from
























Figure 6.1. Effect of work cells on shop performance. (87)
up, welding, brazing, cleaning, inspecting, drilling, threading, and
final assembly. Of these, only bending has a significant setup time.
Equipment setup time for cutting on most modern cutting machines is neg-
ligible and unaffected by pipe diameter, wall thickness, material, or cut
length. Frequently, however, shop practice is to use different cutters
for different diameters of pipe, since a small saw would have difficulty
cutting a 6-inch steel pipe. There is generally one cutter dedicated to
large pipes (such as four inches and above), and several cutters used for
smaller pipes. The fit up process can be slow and tedious, but there is
no equipment setup time involved. It's all done by hand. Tolerances are
achieved by the use of rulers, protractors, and level indicators. The
only exception to this is in end preparation, for which a grinder or
beveling machine might be used. Grinders require no setup time, and
their use is independent of pipe attributes. Beveling machines, however,
do use a different machining head for each diameter. At least one yard
also uses a different bevel angle when the weld joint will require NDT.
While making the appropriate adjustments to the equipment is not diffi-
cult, there is a slight amount of setup time involved.
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The actual welding requires almost no setup time if done manual-
ly. For semi-automated welding, there is a small setup time for securing
the workpiece in the rotational device, but the setup is essentially in-
dependent of the workpiece attributes. Many workpieces cannot be welded
in this manner because of their configuration, but for those that can be,
the setup is the same regardless of diameter, wall thickness, etc. For
different materials, the wire spool and possibly even the shielding gas
must be changed, but these take a matter of seconds. Fully automated
welding on the other hand, could have a significant setup time, partic-
ularly if the welding robot employed a teach mode. Although such systems
are used for structural work in a growing number of shipyards, none that
are known of are currently used for piping nor will be in the foreseeable
future. Brazing is all done manually and requires virtually no setup
time. Cleaning consists of either dipping in a cleaning solution (caus-
tic or acid) or shot blasting. In either case, setup time is negligible
and independent of product attributes. The requirements for cleaning, on
the other hand, are very product dependent, but this will be covered by
process planning. This is also the case for inspection. Drilling and
threading require minimal setup time, and the setup that is required is
essentially independent of product attributes. These are also rare
operations. Final assembly, during which all mechanical joints are put
together, is all done manually with virtually no setup time.
Bending, as previously mentioned, does have a significant setup
time, and it is due to the time required to change the die, clamp lock,
and mandrel. The die and clamp lock are sized by the outside diameter of
the pipe, and the die also varies with desired bend radius. To identify
all the pipe requiring a particular die and clamp lock setup, therefore,
would require grouping into families by nominal pipe size (outer diam-
eter) and bend radius. Mandrel selection is also influenced by wall
thickness. A family that would use the same bender setup would therefore
have to have outer diameter, bend radius, and wall thickness. Since wall
thickness is also a function of material, all family members might also
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be of the same material. This would make family sizes very small, so it
is questionable whether mandrel size should be included as a family at-
tribute. Additionally, changing mandrels is much quicker than changing
dies. All but the largest mandrels take only a few minutes to change,
whereas die changeover times are much longer, as listed in Table 6.1. To
shift from a four-inch to a five-inch die would require 1 O-minute removal
time plus 35-minute installation time for a setup of 45 minutes (not in-
cluding changing the mandrel or positioning the pipe). Actual process
time for any right angle bend is only about 30 seconds.




























Table 6.2 qualitatively summarizes the setup times for each shop
operation (as presently performed) and the product attributes which would
have to be identified in order to uniquely specify the required equipment
setup. Selection of which of these product attributes will be used in
the code will be discussed later, based not only on setup time, but on
other applications as well.
Fixturing is the next level of GT application to work cell devel-
opment. Currently, almost no jigs or fixtures are used in pipe fabrica-
tion. Semi-automated welding is the one possible exception to this,
since it utilizes some simple, adjustable fixtures (Y-supports) to aid in
workpiece rotation. Fixtures could have some application in fit up,
which is currently done entirely by hand using vises, chainfalls, blocks,
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Table 6.2. Pipe shop setup times,
Operation Setup time Product Attributes
Cutting Negligible Unaffected
Bending
Die/clamp Significant Diameter, bend radius
Mandrel Moderate Diameter, wall thickness








and wedges. The critical parameter for fit up are lateral and angular
alignment, end preparation, and root spacing (for butt welds). For small
to moderately sized assemblies, manual fit up works fairly well. For
very large assemblies (where the wedges and chainfalls are required),
fixtures could significantly facilitate fit up. The critical attribute
for a family that could utilize common fixturing would be configuration.
The geometric shape of the assemblies or subassemblies would have to be
similar. As discussed in design recall, configuration can be very diffi-
cult to code, although key aspects of it might be identifiable.
In order to actually design work cells, all the attributes that deter-
mine equipment selection would have to be identified. Process and setup
time for each operation would also have to be contained within the code.
This is closely related to process route generation, the subject of the
next section.
6.1.3 Process Route Generation
Also called computer-aided process planning (CAPP), process route
generation utilizes the software program to generate process plans based
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on information about the end product. With a variant-based planning
scheme, the product information is contained within the code. The code
identifies the assembly as belonging to some particular family for which
a predetermined process route has already been established. A generative
planning scheme, on the other hand, obtains a product description either
from the code or from some other means (such as an interactive terminal
session), then uses artificial intelligence to make up a process plan.
The primary advantage of CAPP is the standardization of process plans.
As presently done in most industries, several planners could make very
different process plans for very similar parts. One nonshipbuilding com-
pany reportedly "used 51 machine tools and 87 different process plans to
produce 150 parts. An investigation determined that these parts could be
produced on only 8 machines via 31 process plans ." (89 ) just as design
recall reduces new part proliferation, CAPP reduces process plan prolif-
eration.
In a shipyard pipe shop, the term "process plan" implies a bit of
formality that simply doesn't exist at the present time. Assembly fabri-
cation is done according to the detailed sketch, but the lead pipefitter
for that assembly uses his experience and judgement to determine the pro-
cess sequence on a case-by-case basis. While he undoubtedly comes up
with a good sequence, it might not be the best possible sequence, and
there is no uniformity in sequencing. For example, suppose a worker is
given a copper assembly to fabricate with the pieces of pipe, one bend,
and four brazed fittings. He'll certainly cut the pipe pieces first,
then make the bend, then start fitting up the joints. He might fit up
one joint, have it brazed, then fit up the next two, and so on. Or he
could fit up three of the joints to begin with. He might even delay
bending until after completion of brazing. If he fits up too many at one
time, the brazer might have trouble brazing one joint without the others
shifting or coming apart. The exact sequence is a function of experi-
ence, judgement, and personal preference. The reason for this wide
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discretion is the uniqueness of most of the piping assemblies. Two im-
portant questions must therefore be answered if GT is to be used for CAPP
for piping assemblies. First, does the degree of assembly uniqueness
really justify the absence of standardized process plans? Second, would
standardized process plans- really be that advantageous? -In other words,
does it really matter whether joints are fit up, then brazed individually
or in groups of two? The answer to the second question is probably no
for a completely manual shop. However, if pipe shops are to ever auto-
mate, then the answer is clearly yes. That is already occurring to some
degree with semi-automatic welders, which can be used much more easily if
the pipe has not yet been bent. The answer to the first question is
probably no, the uniqueness is not sufficient to justify the lack of
standardization. While there will always be some very complex assemblies
that defy standardization of any kind, the majority of assemblies have
enough similarities that a reasonable number of process plans could be
made up to sequence their work. It would be a tedious task, and most
shipyards have probably not attempted it because the benefits are not
immediately obvious. To incorporate adequate information in the code to
generate process plans would require coding all of the operations that
were to be done to the assembly, and coding configuration information
that would determine the exact sequence of operations. If the extent of
work in each operation were also known, then the theoretical through-put
time could be calculated.
6.1.4 Workload Balancing
Workload balancing is a means of controlling work in progress to
maintain a steady, even flow through the shop. Periods of slack are
eliminated, as are bottlenecks, by regulating the distribution of work
within the shop. While schedule float time gives the shop planners some
flexibility in adjusting shop workload, it does not provide a rigorous
method for balancing the workload so that all personnel and work stations
are fully utilized but not overburdened.
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In a typical shipyard pipe shop, shop planners (or assistant fore-
men) make up a shop fabrication schedule based on the ship construction
schedule produced by the shipyard planners. The ship construction sched-
ule specifies when certain segments of system installation are to be com-
plete on board or on block. The shop uses that to determine when each
assembly must be ready for installation, and works backwards to come up
with the fabrication schedule. The shop schedule starts things moving 11
weeks before the finished assembly will be needed for installation on
board. In the first week, the material list is given to the shop stock
room to have a material order written, and the stock room gives the order
back to the planner. Four weeks are then allocated for the planner to
send the order to the shipyard supply department, receive the material,
and sort it by work order. At the end of five weeks, therefore, all
material is on hand and the job is ready to begin. Three weeks are al-
lowed to actually do the work, and there is a three-week buffer zone
prior to the assembly actually being needed for installation.
Three weeks is much more time than is necessary to perform the
actual work, so there is shop floor flexibility built into this system.
The buffer zone adds additional flexibility, but necessarily creates in-
process inventory that might be excessive. Furthermore, the fabrication
schedule is based solely on the installation schedule. Since it is inde-
pendent of assembly work content, bottlenecks at critical work stations
can only be compensated for after they occur and are discovered. Like-
wise, work shortages at other stations can only be compensated for after
discovery, at which point the material for the assemblies that could fill
the work void might not be on hand. Thus, although this system is based
on considerable experience and generally works adequately, it does not
optimize shop operations and it does not prevent work disruption— it only
reacts to it.
Workload balancing can prevent disruption by identifying workload
requirements for each assembly, then scheduling the appropriate mix of
assemblies so that all work stations are fairly evenly loaded. If it is
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not possible to balance the workload due to the work content of the as-
semblies as a whole, then the capacity of the shop work stations should
be appropriately adjusted, or subcontracting should be utilized to change
the shop's workload. There is an implicit trade-off in this analysis be-
tween balancing and in-process inventory. If the shop would have to
reach ahead three months in the schedule to get an assembly that would
balance the workload, it might not be worth it. That decision will de-
pend on many factors such as available laydown area and special material
requirements.
In order to be useful for workload balancing, the GT code would
have to specify not only the work stations that the assembly would need
to go through, but also provide information upon which time estimates
could be based.
6.1.5 Work Content Estimating
It was clear in the last section that work content must be identi-
fied in order to permit effective workload balancing. While time at each
work station is the critical parameter for workload balancing, the quan-
titative nature of the work (independent of any time scale) might be of
interest in and of itself. If, for example, the shop was considering
purchasing a new bending machine and was trying to decide how large a
machine to get, it would be very helpful to know how many bends of each
pipe size the shop actually does. Such information is also necessary in
designing process flow lanes, and it could be included in the code. To
fully describe the work content would require identifying many assembly
attributes, including the following: number and diameter of cuts; num-
ber, diameter, and bend radius of bends; material; number, diameter, and
type of welds; number and diameter of brazes; drilling and threading
requirements; final assembly requirements; inspection requirements; and
surface treatment requirements. This is a rather formidable list of at-
tributes, and it might be desirable to choose only the attributes for a
more limited number of critical operations.
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That completes the design and manufacturing applications of group
technology to piping systems; however, material and accounting/scheduling
are of practical interest to any shipyard coding scheme and will be dis-
cussed briefly.
6.1.6 Material Requirements List
Just as work content can be codified for each assembly, so too can
material content. The information could then be used both for material
ordering to support shop operations and as a basis for large-scale mate-
rial content studies. The information that would have to be contained in
the code would include pipe material, length, diameter, and wall thick-
ness, fitting identification and quantity, and other component identifi-
cation and quantity.
6.1.7 Accounting and Scheduling
In addition to a physical description of each assembly, a func-
tioning shipyard needs to know how and when each assembly is to be used
in the end product. Scheduling information is, of course, just dates.
Useful accounting information would include the ship that the assembly is
destined for, the unit on the ship into which it will be installed, the
pallet of assemblies with which it will go to the ship, the SWBS system
identification, and a piece or drawing number that uniquely identifies
that assembly. All shipyards have their own systems currently in use to
identify some or all of this information, usually requiring about ten
total digits.
To summarize, code applications could be broadly categorized as
design, manufacturing, material, or accounting/scheduling. Manufacturing
would include cell development, generative process planning, workload
balancing, and work content estimating. The pipe assembly attributes
that would need to be identified in the code for each of these four cate-
gories are summarized in Table 6.3. Some of these attributes could be
described by one digit; others would take a large number of digits. For
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example, configuration would be very difficult to describe for all but
the simplest of shapes. Fitting and component identification would also
be very difficult. To fully identify a flange, for example, the code
would have to specify, as a minimum, material, diameter, thickness,
number of holes, hole diameter, and hole location. Method of casting or
forging, certification standards, and mating surface finish would have to
be known if it were to be used in certain critical systems. Valves would
require even more information. Other attributes, such as bend radius and
inspection requirements, could each be coded with one digit. The four
major categories listed in Table 6.3 will next be briefly summarized.
Table 6.3. Pipe assembly attributes applicable to various
types of codes.
Account/
Attribute Design Manufacture Material Schedule
Material X X X
Diameter X X X





Type of joints X
# of joints X
Fitting ID, no. X x .
Component ID, no. X X
Overall dimensions X
Configuration X X














A design code must describe the form, fit, and function of the
assembly. Overall dimensions and configuration are necessary to describe
form and fit. Fit would also depend on fitting identification for the
description of end fittings, such as flanges. Function would depend on
material, wall thickness, component identification (valves, strainers,
etc.), surface treatment, and inspection requirements. A code to allow
design recall of pipe assemblies would therefore be extremely ambitious,
and it will not be attempted here. Design recall of very simple assem-
blies and subassemblies might be feasible and does warrant further atten-
tion, though none will be given to it in this thesis.
Developing a material code would similarly involve . the arduous
task of codifying fitting and component descriptions. Shipyard supply
systems typically use eight digits to identify parts such as valves and
fittings. Even if it were possible be reduce that somewhat, it would
still take a prohibitive number of digits to identify the material re-
quirements for an assembly with multiple fittings and components. It
also is not clear that there is a real advantage to consolidating the
material requirements list into a long single code, and this will there-
fore not be attempted. Although "competitive shipbuilders regard
computer-aided material definition as their most important computer ap-
plication, "
(
1 0) this does not require coding the material requirements
list (MRL) in a GT fashion. It is a separate issue. One very useful
output of a partial material code, however, could be the development of a
cutting plan. If the length of a given type and size of pipe for each
assembly were known, the software program could determine a cutting plan
to minimize the scrap pipe left over after cutting the raw pipe stock.
At least two shipyards already do this independently of their coding
schemes. Use of the code as the data base for the cutting plan will be
considered in the section on code development. Inclusion of manufactur-
ing attributes and accounting information will also be considered. Be-
fore attempting to design a new code, though, it is worthwhile to examine
two piping assembly codes currently in use.
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6.2 Existing Pipe Assembly Codes
Todd Shipyards in San Pedro, California, and National Steel and
Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) in San Diego, California, both employ sim-
ple codes to aid the operation of their pipe shops. Both will be pre-
sented, explained, and analyzed.
6.2.1 Todd Shipyards ( 91 )
Todd uses a 2-digit shop routing code to group pipe assemblies
into one of 11 families, as shown in Table 6.4. This is not a GT code
per se in that the digits do not have fixed meanings in either a monocode
or polycode fashion. Nevertheless, it does form product families, which
are shown in Figure 6-2. The first digit indicates the general complex-
ity of the assembly, unless it is a four, in which case it indicates NDT
requirements. The second digit indicates pipe diameter less than 3 1/2
inches if it is a blank, 3 1/2 inches or above if it is an "L," and braz-
ing instead of welding if it is a "C." The code does a very good job at
what it is intended to do
—
give the general route through the shop that
the assembly will follow. This is a rough form of variant-based process
planning, although it obviously could not produce a detailed process
sequence. Similarly, it identifies the basic equipment that will be used
in the fabrication process (large bender, small bender, welding booth,
brazing table, etc.), although it does not provide enough information for
formal process flow lane development. Although it identifies which bend-
ing machine would be used, it does not identify the required die size, so
it could not be used to reduce bender setup time. By identifying NDT
requirements, it could reduce bevel machine setup time, since Todd uses a
different bevel angle for NDT quality welds. Finally, the code could be
used for work content estimating and workload balancing, but only in a
very, very general sense. The code obviously is not intended to be used
for design recall, material planning, or accounting. Todd uses a sepa-
rate code for accounting purposes.
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Table 6.4. Todd Shipyards' pipe shop routing code
CODE DESCRIPTION
1 Straight pipe or pipe requiring bending only, 3-1/2" IPS
and below.
2 Straight pipe with welded fittings, 3-1/2" IPS and below.
3 Complex assemblies which require subassembly, 3-1/2"
and below.
4 Assemblies requiring NDT quality welding 3-1/2" and below,
1L Straight pipe or pipe requiring bending only, 4" IPS
and above
.
2L Straight pipe with welded fittings 4" IPS and -above.
3L Complex assemblies which require subassembly, 4" IPS
and above.
4L Assemblies requiring NDT quality welding 4" IPS and above.
2C Straight pipe with brazed fittings.
3C Complex brazed assemblies which require subassembly.
4C Assemblies requiring NDT quality brazing.










Any piping configuration requiring non-destructive testing.
(X-ray, dye penetrant, ultrasonic, magnetic particle)
Figure 6-2. Todd shipyards' pipe assembly families.
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6.2.2 NASSCO ( 92 >
The NASSCO code is a more formal four-digit polycode which identi-





The attribute descriptions are listed in Table 6.5. A total of 288 fami-
lies can be mathematically generated by the digits, but some of those
would represent contradictory attributes. For example, a "no bending"
configuration could not also be a "complex" assembly." There are 78 con-
sistent families that NASSCO actually manufactures in its construction of
























hospital ships. This code is similar to Todd's in that its primary pur-
pose is to establish shop routes for the families. NASSCO divides its
pipe shop into five work stations, as listed in Table 6.6. As can be
Table 6.6. NASSCO pipe shop work station.-
Station Process Activities
114 Preparation In-process storage, blasting, cutting
115 Bending Bending
116 Assembly Fitting, welding, brazing, bolting
117 Treatment Cleaning, galvanizing, painting
118 Palletize Kitting, storage
seen, these are fairly broad work stations, with four of the five per-
forming multiple functions. NASSCO uses the code to form families and
establish the routing sequence through the workstations for each family.
In process planning capabilities, it is somewhat more detailed than
Todd's code, which does not include treatment, does not define assembly
complexity as thoroughly, and does not contain any information on the
size of brazed pipe. Todd's however, does include inspection require-
ments, which is most likely a reflection of the difference in the types
of ships that Todd and NASSCO build. NASSCO 's code also duplicates some
information, with both the second and third digits indicating pipe size.
In addition to establishing shop routing by family, NASSCO
estimates time and labor manhours at each station for each family. It
does this in a very general manner, though. For example, consider the
way in which labor expenditure is calculated for a medium-bending family
(second digit= 2) at work station 115 (bender). Actual process time for
the medium bender using two workers is estimated to be 4.5 minutes per
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bend, or 9 man-minutes per bend. A study done at NASSCO (referred to as
the Waterman Contract) concluded that there are an average of 1.4 bends
in a medium-sized assembly (1.4 x 9 = 12.6 man-minutes per assembly).
However, the actual bend time represents only 40% of the time on station,
with 60% being non-process time (12.5/0.4 = 32 man-minutes at station 115
for a medium-bending family member). NASSCO then assigns three days at
work station 115 for calculating total through-put time. Two points are
immediately obvious. First, a lot of float time is built into the
through-put schedule. Second, the process times are based on statistical
averages rather than each particular assembly. This limits, the ability
of the code to be used for workload balancing, since an assembly with one
weld could be indistinguishable (in the code) from an assembly with eight
welds. Furthermore, all assemblies requiring any manual assembly are
classified as being complex, regardless of the number (or lack of) welds
or brazes. Work content analysis is similarly limited, and setup time,
although included in the time estimating algorithm, cannot be reduced
with this code.
Nevertheless, the NASSCO code does a good job in establishing shop
routes and in roughly estimating through-put time and labor time for each
family. It provides more information than Todd's code, as it should
since it has twice as many digits. Although the time and labor analysis
is fairly general, it is probably adequate for NASSCO' s current shop
operations and workload. By using such a large amount of float time,
NASSCO never presses their system to its limits. While this is safe, it
precludes the achievement of optimum shop efficiency.
6.3 New Code Development
It was originally decided to develop a comprehensive code to in-
clude all manufacturing attributes as well as accounting information.
This, unfortunately, resulted in a 24-digit numeric code that still did
not fully describe configuration and had numerous other shortfalls. The
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attributes identified by the code are listed in Table 6.7. Wall thick-
ness could be given in ten intervals (0-9), as could pipe diameter and
length. This code allows for two different pipe diameters in the same
assembly, and it identifies the operations that will occur on each. Pipe
length was included for cutting plan generation. Total number of fit-
tings was included to give an idea of overall complexity and assembly
time. Unfortunately, though, this code is a good example of not properly
identifying the intended code use and using that as a basis for attribute
description.




3 No. of fittings
4 First pipe: diameter
5 Length
6 No . of cuts
7 No . of bends
8 No. of joints
9 Second pipe: diameter
10 Length
11 No . of cuts
12 No. of bends
13 No. of joints














First, material and wall thickness (and hence raw pipe material)
cannot be uniquely identified with one numeric digit each. To create a
cutting plan requires not just the basic material (steel, CuNi, etc.) but
the specific alloy (to uniquely identify the pipe). Wall thickness would
have to be known precisely rather than within one of ten intervals. How-
ever, switching to an alphanumeric code could uniquely identify standard
pipe materials and schedule numbers, since it would allow 26 choices per
digit. Length, though, should be identified to within 1/8 inch (which is
the standard shop cutting tolerance). Using a possible length range of
20 ft necessitates 1920 length intervals. This would require three let-
ters or four numeric digits. While it might be possible to solve any
coding problem by throwing enough digits at it, it was decided here not
to try to use the code to create the cutting plan. The MRL could be used
as the cutting plan data base, as is the practice at Todd and NASSCO. It
was also decided to use an alphanumeric code, since that would allow pipe
diameter (for standard pipe sizes) to be uniquely identified by one
digit.
The second major shortcoming is that although the number of joints
in each pipe is specified, it is not specified whether those are welds or
brazes. The material identification would answer that, unless it were
CuNi, which can be either welded or brazed. Third, there's really no
reason to include all of the accounting information in the code. This is
a matter of shipyard preference. Accounting information , like the MRL,
will have to be placed somewhere, and some yards might prefer to include
it in one consolidated code; but those digits should be added to the code
as a suffix or prefix on an "as-desired" basis.
In redesigning the code, it was desired to shorten it, to restrict
the number of attributes to those really necessary for the intended end
use, and to ensure that those attributes are adequately addressed. Al-
though longer codes are in commercial use today, a shorter code is always
preferable if it can accomplish its task. A shorter code both saves time
that is spent on coding each assembly and would probably meet with less
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resistance from managers who are unfamiliar with GT. The first task,
therefore, was to clearly identify the end uses of the code. The primary
uses of this code will be to reduce setup time and to balance the work-
load. Secondary uses will be process planning, process flow lane (work
cell) development, and work content estimating.
Table 6.2 summarized setup time requirements for all pipe shop
operations. Only die and clamp changing on the bending machines entailed
a significant setup time, and it will be the only stepup time considered
by the code. Mandrel setup time will not be addressed because virtually
every pipe requires a different mandrel. To save significant mandrel
setup time would require batching together pipes that might not otherwise
be started for quite some time. Although a more rigorous analysis should
be done to substantiate this, it is believed that the disadvantage of
increased in-process inventory would outweigh any advantage from de-
creased setup time. Reduction of setup time will therefore require only
two digits: pipe diameter and bend radius. This implicitly assumes two
things: first, that all the pipe in the assembly is of the same diam-
eter, and second, that all the bends are of the same radius. While the
first code allowed for two pipe sizes, this code will only allow for
one. Where more than one size is present in the assembly, that pipe
representing the greatest amount of work will be the diameter shown in
the code. To justify this restriction, 69 firemain and flushing system
detailed sketches (for FFG-7) were examined for multiple pipe sizes.
Ninety percent had only one pipe size. Seven percent had two, and 3 per-
cent had three or more. This is admittedly a rather small sample size
and is taken from only one system, but it is believed to be representa-
tive of the ship as a whole. The pipe size distribution in the firemain
and flushing system is no more concentrated at one or two sizes than in
any other system. Consequently, assemblies with multiple pipe sizes are
no more likely to occur in other systems. For single pipe size assem-
blies, shop experience and a study of these same drawings indicate that a
single bend radius is almost always used.
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The other primary code function will be for use in workload
balancing. The goal of workload balancing is to evenly distribute work
throughout the shop and to prevent bottlenecks. It might not be neces-
sary, however, to fully quantify every work process that will be done to
each assembly. Rather, only the critical processes need to be speci-
fied. Threading machines, for example, will sit idle most of the time no
matter how much batching and balancing is done. Shop threading capacity
cannot be reduced without eliminating it altogether, and it is highly un-
likely that there would ever be a bottleneck at the threading machine, so
inclusion of threading requirements in the code would not serve a useful
function in workload balancing. Cutting and drilling, although more com-
mon, will not be included for the same basic reason—they simply are not
limiting shop functions. Cutting is quick and simple and done to all
pipes. Drilling, though not quite as simple, is still fairly quick and
is not commonly done. It is difficult to imagine a backlog at the dril-
ling station. Furthermore, the equipment does not represent a major
capital investment, and the labor requirements are minimal.
The only processes in which bottlenecks normally occur are welding
and brazing, including fit up. The number of welds and the number of
brazes will therefore be identified by the code. Although butt welds are
more difficult and take more time than socket welds, the code will not
explicitly distinguish between the two. The total time difference (be-
tween a butt and a socket) for manual fit up and welding of a 3-inch
joint in stainless steel pipe is 15 minutes (75 vs 60). While this is
not a negligible difference, it is small enough that the workload balanc-
ing algorithms should be able to minimize its adverse impact. Joints
larger than three inches are almost always butt welded, so the diameter
digit would give some indication of the type of weld joint. Pipe diam-
eter would also be necessary input into the balancing algorithms since it
has a major effect on fit up and weld time. Furthermore, the pipe mate-
rial is critical in determining both the welding process and the welding
time, so material will be identified in the code.
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Bending, final assembly, and quality assurance inspection require-
ments will also be included in the code for balancing purposes. Bending
does not normally produce a bottleneck, but the number of bends would
nevertheless be valuable information for two reasons. First, batching to
reduce bending setup time could produce delays at the bending machines,
so the number of bends would be vital information in avoiding such a
backlog. Second, bending machines represent a substantial capital
investment, so decisions to remedy chronic balancing problems through
bending facilities expansion or reduction would be major decisions and
would require thorough bending information. This could also be consid-
ered a work content function; regardless, the number of bends will be
included as a digit.
Final assembly is simply the making up of mechanical joints after
all welding and brazing are complete. It requires no expensive equip-
ment, but it is labor intensive and should therefore be included to help
balance shop manning. The number of mechanical joints will be used as a
general indication of final assembly difficulty and duration. Time esti-
mates will also be dependent on pipe diameter, since larger joints take
longer to assemble.
Quality assurance (NDT) inspection requirements will be included
for two reasons. First, they impact on labor requirements. Only certain
welders are qualified to do NDT quality welding. To prevent those
welders from becoming overloaded, NDT quality welds should be identi-
fied.
Second, the persons performing NDT inspections are not pipe-
fitters. They work for the QA department and only come to the pipe shop
when called to do so (a form of setup time). Identifying QA requirements
in the code would allow the shop schedulers (via the balancing software)
to group assemblies together in a manner that optimizes the use of quali-
ty assurance personnel.
To summarize so far, reduction of setup time and workload balanc-
ing would require the following attributes to be identified by the code:
pipe diameter, bend radius, number of welds, number of brazes, material,
109

number of bends, number of mechanical joints, and inspection require-
ments t>
The secondary uses of the code will be for rough process planning
(shop routing), process flow lane development, and work content estimat-
ing. Some aspects of work content estimating are essential to workload
balancing and have already been discussed. Of secondary importance for
this code are the aspects of work content estimating that are useful in
and of themselves (as the basis for statistical surveys, for example).
The only additional attribute that must be described for these
functions is treatment (clean, paint, and galvanize). Treatment was not
included as a balancing attribute because of the nature Of the work.
Cleaning is done in a large tank that can accommodate many pipe pieces at
one time, and the pieces are left in the tank only briefly. Painting is
done outside the shop in the shipyard painting facilities, which are
typically so vast that even extreme fluctuations in the pipe assembly
workload would have no overall impact. Galvanization is generally
subcontracted to a vendor, and it is extremely rare. It is therefore
difficult to conceive of these processes creating bottlenecks. Painting
and galvanization, however, do take time since they are done at remote
locations, so they must be considered in shop routing and through-put
time calculations. Cleaning is also of interest to shop routing,
although it doesn't have a large effect on through-put time. Cutting is
again neglected, because every pipe goes through cutting. Whether one
cut or many cuts are made makes very little difference time-wise.
Drilling and threading could be included for shop routing, but is not
believed that there would be a real advantage to this. If the code were
intended to be used to produce detailed process plans, then it would
certainly be necessary; however, the detail sketch will accompany the





In order to adequately perform its intended functions, the code
must describe the attributes listed in Table 6.8. By using an alpha
numeric code, each attribute can be adequately described by one digit.
The attribute descriptions are listed in Table 6.9. Pipe diameter is
described by a letter that identifies any of the standard pipe sizes plus
several others that are commonly used on ships (5/8, 7/8, and 1-1/8).
There are several nonstandard pipe sizes that are occasionally used on
ships that are not explicitly identified by the attribute description.
These would be coded as the next higher diameter, since that is the die
size that would be used for bending such a pipe. (This also raises the
design question: why not standard size pipes, even if that means a minor
weight penalty in some cases? Standardization and inventory control
would benefit.) The bend radius digit simply gives the bend radius in
pipe diameters. For assemblies without any bends, a zero would be used.





4 Number of bends
5 Number of welds




Material is not uniquely identified by the material digit—there
are, for example, several types of stainless steel in common use in pip-
ing systems. However, the general manufacturing procedures are the same
for all of them, so there is no need to distinguish them in the code.
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Table 6.9. Code attribute descriptions.
Pipe diameter: A 1/8 M 2-1/2
B 1/4 N 3
- C - 3/8 3-1/2
D 1/2 P 4
E 5/8 Q 5
F 3/4 R 6
G 7/8 S 8
.
H 1 T 10
I 1-1/8 U 12
J 1-1/4 V 14

















7 Other (flex hos as, etc.)
No. of bends: 0- 9
No. of welds: 0- 9 (no. of we!Lded j(Dints
)
No. of brazes: 0- 9 (no. of brazed j<Dints
























I- Same as B--H plus hydro
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If a detailed process instruction were to be generated on the sole basis
of the code, such a distinction would have to be made. Material identi-
fication number seven (other) is used for flex hoses and any other type
of piping that does not use the normal pipe shop processes. Alternative-
ly, the shop could simply decide not- to code such assemblies of all.
The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh digits give a numerical
count of the number of bends, welds, brazes, and mechanical joints,
respectively. Nine would have to indicate nine or more. It is believed
that very few assemblies have more than nine of any of these. If future
experience proved otherwise, changing any of these digits to a letter
designation would alleviate the shortfall. Although computers can deal
as easily with letters as with numbers, numeric designators have been
used for these attributes to make the code more meaningful to humans
.
The treatment and inspection digits cover all possible combinations of
treatment and inspection processes. Inspection combinations that are
never used in practice (such as UT and MT) are not included.
6.5 Code Limitations
The code has some definite limitations, both informationally and
functionally, some of which have already been discussed. To summarize
them, the code will accurately describe only an assembly with one pipe
diameter and one material. It does not identify certain processes, such
as cutting, drilling, and threading. It does not distinguish between
socket and butt welds. Perhaps most importantly, it does not give de-
tailed sequence information. For example, two assemblies, each with four
brazed joints, would both have a "4" as the sixth digit and possibly
identical codes altogether, even though the sequential interaction be-
tween fit up and brazing could be vastly different for the two assem-
blies. Similarly, the inspection description does not distinguish be-
tween inspection of the completed product and in-process inspection (such
as PT of a root pass). These informational limitations primarily limit
the code's utility for process planning. General shop routes are all
that this code will produce—somewhat more detailed than the Todd or
NASSCO code, but not significantly. The code's strong point is reduction
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of setup time, since it uniquely identifies the setup requirements for
bending, the only shop process that involves significant setup time.
Previous codes did not do this.
The code can be used for workload balancing with for greater accu-
racy than was possible with previous- codes, but it still contians some
workload generalizations. This rases the question: how accurately
should a code identify the workload requirements? Anyone who has per-
sonally observed a shipyard pipe shop in operation would probably answer
that considerble slack could be allowed. The author would agree, but
only for the manner in which pipe shops currently operate. All of the
pipe shops that the author visited were in periods of low workload, so
workload perturbations at any or all workstations were easily absorbed.
During periods of heavy workload, however, balancing will become a much
more important issue and greater workload forecasting accuracy will be
required. If a shop never experiences a workload that strains its capa-
city, then it has too much capacity and is wasting money on excess labor
and facilities. Furthermore, as pipe shops automate, tighter controls
will be necessary to fully exploit the benefits of that automation. This
code can help to identify targets for automation by its work content
estimating capability. Unfortunately, it does not distinguish welds that
can or cannot be automated, nor welds that should be completed prior to
bending. Such distinctions would depend on configuration attributes that
would be very difficult to code.
The practical use of this code will be examined further in the
next chapter. The attempt here was to design a code that could be used
for several important functions, not all of which can be individually
optimized simultaneously. Reducing setup time, for example, might be
complete against workload balancing. Given enough information, it
should be possible to produce an overall optimization scheme through the
development of process flow lanes. Even without going that far, the code





GT PIPE CODE APPLICATIONS
The code developed in Chapter 6 will now be applied to various
pipe assemblies. Shop routing of these assemblies will be discussed, and
workload balancing and setup time reduction will be analyzed using quan-
titative data from FFG-7 piping systems.
7.1 Assembly Coding
Appendix A shows the detailed sketches of four pipe assemblies.
The first three are CuNi assemblies from the FFG-7 firemain and flushing
system. The fourth is a hypothetical four-inch ips steel assembly which
requires final MT. The CuNi assemblies are all brazed and do not require
quality assurance inspection. The coding process is simple, and the
codes are listed in Table 7.1.













Assembly #1 is a 3" nominal pipe size (first digit = N) CuNi as-
sembly (third digit = 4) with no bends or welds, one braze, and no mech-
anical joints. Digits two and four through seven are therefore 0, 0, 0,
1, and 0, respectively. There are no treatment or inspection require-
ments, so the final two digits are OA. Assembly #2 is 2-1/2" nominal
pipe size (first digit = M) with 7-1/2" radius bends (3D bends, second
digit =3). It is also CuNi (third digit =4). There are three bends,
no welds, two brazes, and two mechanical joints (one on • each side of
valve V-47), so the fourth through seventh digits are 3, 0, 2, and 2,
respectively. It also has no treatment or inspection requirements, mak-
ing OA the last two digits. Assembly #3 is similar to #2, except that it
is 3" nominal pipe size and has 8 brazes and no bends. Assembly #4 is a
4" ips (first digit = P) steel assembly (third digit = 1) with a single
3D bend (second digit = 3, fourth digit =1). There are 7 welds, no
brazes, and no mechanical joints, making 700 the next three digits.
Final cleaning and MT are required, so 1 and E are the eighth and ninth
digits, respectively.
7.2 Shop Routing
The layout of the major workstations in a typical shipyard pipe
shop is shown in Figure 7.1. It accurately represents the functional
layout and, to some degree, the relative sizes and shapes of the work-
stations; however, it is not to scale and does not accurately represent
floor space allocation. Painting and galvanizing, which are not normally
done in the shop, are not included. Drilling and threading are similarly
omitted. End-preparation will be considered to be done at either the
cutting of fit-up workstations; hence, a separate beveling/end-
preparation workstation is not included.
The general route through the shop can be determined from the
code; however, some of the details of the shop routing will depend on
assembly features that are not included in the code. For assembly #1,
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the code identifies that other than cutting, the assembly will require
only fit up and brazing of one joint. In this case the code contains
sufficient information to specify the exact shop route, which is shown in
Figure 7.2. In all the shop routing figures, each line represents a dis-
tinct piece of pipe. Flow between workstations is represented by solid
lines. Flow through workstations is represented by dashed lines. Multi-
ple lines converging into a single line indicates joining, either by fit
up for welding/brazing or by final assembly.
In order to determine the shop routes for the remaining three
assemblies, several assumptions regarding shop practice must be made.
First, assume that all brazing and welding is done after bending. Al-
though not always desirable, this is in fact the normal practice in most
pipe shops. Second, assume that all straight assemblies or subassemblies
are welded with the semi-automatic welding equipment. Delaying bending
until after welding would allow semi-automatic welding in some cases in
which it would otherwise not be possible. Identifying those cases,
though, is beyond the capability of this code. For the analysis here,
therefore, normal shop practice will be used. Third, assume that bending
is always followed by cleaning to remove the mandrel oil. Finally, as-
sume that all mechanical joints are made up after welding and brazing are
completed. These last two assumptions are generally the case, although
there could be exceptions.
Assembly #2's code identifies that it must be bent, brazed, and
final assembled. Since it is CuNi, it is automatically known that it
must be annealed prior to bending. Cleaning will automatically follow
bending. The general route is therefore known to proceed in the follow-
ing order: cut, anneal, bend, clean, fit up, braze, and final assemble.
For the particular assembly (with only two brazes), that is sufficient to
uniquely identify the route, which is shown in Figure 7.3.
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Assembly #3 is somewhat more complicated, with four separate pipe
pieces, eight brazes, and two mechanical joints. To clarify the routing
explanation, the pipe pieces have been designated p1 , p2, p3, and p4 in
the diagram in Appendix A. This assembly points out the limitations a
pipe code faces when being used for "generative process planning with cur-
rent shop practices. For this assembly, the code only indicates that it
must be brazed and final assembled. The exact sequence would be deter-
mined by the lead pipefitter to whom the assembly is assigned, but it
probably would be as shown in Figure 7.4. After cutting, p1 would be
fitted with its elbow and flange, then brazed and acid dipped. It then
would be ready for final assembly. p2 and p3 would be fitted with the
elbow between them and the flange on the end of p2. Brazing of the three
joints would be next, followed by acid dip and return to the fit up
table. The other elbow, p4, and the tee would be added to this subassem-
bly, and those joints would then be brazed and dipped. Next, it would be
joined with the valve (V1 ) and the other subassembly (containing p1 ) in
final assembly.
Final assembly and fit up frequently take place at the same loca-
tion. The lead pipefitter for that assembly follows it through all
stages of fabrication. He cuts the pipe, fits up the joints, takes it to
the brazing station, brings it back, and final assembles it. Only braz-
ing, welding, and, in some shops, bending are done by specialized work-
ers. The unique nature of each pipe assembly encourages - this type of
work organization. One advancement that would help to standardize proc-
ess routes would be the use of induction brazing. Induction brazing can
be done without the physical motion required of the workpiece and brazer
in flame brazing, since the coils uniformly heat the entire joint area.
This would enable all joints to be fit up prior to brazing in all but the
most complex assemblies. Induction brazing is not currently approved for
use on most naval piping systems; further investigation into its use
would therefore appear to be warranted.
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Assembly #4 is identified by the code as requiring one bend, seven
welds, final cleaning, and MT inspection. The shop route for this assem-
bly is shown in Figure 7.5. As with assembly #3, planning the exact
route requires configuration information that is not contained within the
code. Because six of the seven welds lie on a linear subassembly, those
six can all be made with the semi-automatic welding equipment. Only the
weld joining the bent pipe piece to the tee must be done by hand. The
shop route would therefore join the four straight pipe pieces, the
valves, and the tee at the fit-up station, then weld all these at the
automatic welding station. The other pipe piece would be bent, cleaned,
then fit up and welded to the completed linear subassembly. Figure 7.5
shows the fully welded assembly going to the NDT station for MT. In
reality, though, MT equipment is very portable, and inspection could be
done at the welding station. Whether each weld is inspected after it is
finished is purely a matter of discretion. If weld repairs would be made
much more difficult by further fabrication of the assembly, inspection
should be done before proceeding to the next joints. Generally, though,
all joints would be inspected at the end (unless in-process inspection
was required )
.
Final cleaning will similarly depend on information not contained
in the code. Since assembly #4 has valves in it, the completed assembly
would not be dipped in the cleaning tank. Rather, each pipe piece would
be cleaned prior to joining, and, if necessary, the completed assembly
would be flushed. If the raw pipe had a significant amount of scale in
it, shot blasting might be required prior to fabrication. For the sake
of clarity, cleaning details are not included in Figure 7.5.
The GT code gives a general idea of what the shop routing for a
given assembly will be. For many simple assemblies, the routing is
exact. For complex assemblies, additional information is required, and
this information generally concerns configuration and would be very
difficult to code. Since this code is not intended to be used for exact
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generative process planning, this limitation is not significant. Regard-
less of all the process sequencing details, the code does contain total
work content information and therefore could serve as a basis for
through-put time estimating. Since the code breaks down the work content
by workstation, it is also very useful for workload balancing, although
detailed routing information would be necessary for highly accurate bal-
ancing.
7.3 Workload Balancing
The previous section analyzed shop routing through a functional
diagram that bore some similarity to the actual physical shop layout.
This section will examine routing through a shop routing "tree," as shown
in Figure 7.6. Each block in the tree represents a distinct process,
such as cutting, bending, brazing, etc. Each assembly follows a path
through the tree that includes all the processes which must be done to
that assembly. The intent is simply to identify those processes which a
given assembly will require. . Each assembly is therefore considered in
its entirety. Individual pipe pieces that do not require work are not
shown separately. The only instance in which multiple branching is pos-
sible is for welding, since both hand welding and automatic welding can
take place on the same assembly. The paths for assemblies one through
four are shown in Figure 7.7 through 7.10, respectively.
The tree is basically divided into the two fabrication categories
of welding and brazing. The left-hand side is for welded materials
(steel, stainless steel, and aluminum). The right-hand side is for
brazed materials (copper, copper-nickel, and brass). In the ensuing
analysis, copper-nickel will be assumed to be brazed. When both cate-
gories use the same process, such as cutting (which is done independently
of material), both path lines go through the same block. The blocks
identify only the process, not the specific equipment. The large,
medium, and small rotary benders are therefore grouped together into the
same block. For actual shop workload balancing, equipment would have to
be distinguished within each block.
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Aluminum is a special case in that it is welded as ferrous mate-
rials are, but it is annealed prior to bending as copper and copper al-
loys are. It therefore has its own branch path through annealing, bend-
ing, and cleaning before rejoining steel and stainless steel for fit up
and welding.
The paths are intended to show the sequence of the processes. The
tree structure therefore assumes, as before, that all bending is done
prior to welding or brazing, that cleaning always follows immediately
after bending, and that mechanical joints are made up at the very end.
The tree structure does not allow for assemblies with both brazing and
welding (as could be the case for CuNi ) . Additionally, it does not
specify the type of surface treatment or NDT inspection. These two
blocks can be thought of as containing trees within them which consist of
the various individual treatment and inspection processes, such as clean-
ing and radiography.
The shop routing tree can be a useful tool in visualizing work
content estimating and workload balancing using the GT code. The code
uniquely identifies the path through the tree for each assembly, with the
only exception being that the code does not distinguish automatic welding
from hand welding. In addition to identifying the processes, though, the
code quantifies the workload for that process for each assembly (by spec-
ifying the number of bends, welds, brazes, etc.). That information could
be shown by the width of the path lines going into each process block.
The width scale for each block could be the number of times that process
must be done to that assembly. Alternatively, the time for each process
could be calculated and the path line width could represent time. This
would incorporate information regarding different process times for dif-
ferent materials and pipe sizes and would put the entire diagram into one
scale; it would therefore be a much more useful representation.
In order to demonstrate the GT code's utility for workload balanc-
ing, the routing tree will be used to analyze total work content on FFG-7
piping systems. The data on the piping systems is taken from a study
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performed by IHI consultants for Bath Iron Works. (93) ^he study ex-
cluded gauge piping that is fabricated on board. It therefore came up
with a total pipe length of 61,564 ft, compared to the 86,619 ft cited in
Chapter 5. The difference of 25,000 ft seems excessive for gauge piping
length. The methodology for determining the pipe length in the earlier
(Todd) study is not known by the author, so this could account for part
of the difference. The BIW study lengths were taken from the pipe mate-
rial lists on the detailed pipe drawings. Some basic study conclusions
are listed in Table 7.2. Table 7.3 lists the number of straight, bent,
and total assembly by material.
Table 7.2. FFG piping system data.
Total number of assemblies = 10,320
Number of straight assy = 1 ,401
Number of bend assy = 8,919
Total number of bends = 14,357
Total number of cuts = 21 ,505
Total number of fittings = 27,435
Table 7.3. FFG piping assemblies by material,
Material Straight Bent Total
Steel 263 1222 1485
Stainless Steel 95 574 669
Aluminum 30 174 204
Copper 563 4133 4696
Copper-Nickel 442 2812 3254




The study did categorize the assemblies by their general level of
complexity, based on the total number of fittings in the assembly. How-
ever, it did not distinguish mechanical from welded or brazed joints, and
it grouped together assemblies with zero and one fitting. For the pur-
pose of analysis, therefore, it will be assumed that half the simplest
category of assemblies (zero or one fitting) have no fittings and require
no welding or brazing. The other half, as well as all the more complex
assemblies, require welding or brazing. While the total number of fit-
tings was given as 27,435, and while the study broke this down into gen-
eral functional categories of fittings, it did not categorize them by
joining process (mechanical, welding, or brazing). It will be assumed
that the fitting distribution is independent of material, and that 15% of
the fittings are mechanically joined, the other 85% being welded or
brazed. These assumptions result in the assembly data listed in Table
7.4.


















Of the 1730 welded assemblies, it will be assumed that the same
straight/bent ratio holds as is true for the assemblies overall (13.6%
straight, 86.4% bent). That results in 235 straight welded assemblies,
and 1495 bent welded assemblies. If we further assume that the welded
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fittings are evenly distributed between the straight and bent assemblies,
then there are 724 welded fittings on straight assemblies, and 4604
welded fittings on bent assemblies. This is probably a weak assumption,
since straight assemblies are very simple and would tend to have fewer
fittings. Finally, if we. assume that all the fittings on the straight
assemblies can be welded with the semi-automatic welding equipment and
estimate that one-fourth of the fittings on bent assemblies can be semi-
automatically welded, then 3,453 fittings must be hand welded, and 1,875
fittings can be semi-automatically welded. Some fittings will be welded
or brazed on both sides. Others will only be welded or brazed on one
side, with the other side being made up during installation on board. We
will assume a 50% split here, so that there are 1 .5 welds or brazes per
fitting. Also assume that for every three welded fittings, there is one
butt weld joining two pipe pieces directly, and that the butt weld dis-
tribution between hand and automatic is the same as for fittings. Mech-
anical components tend to be installed on both sides in the shop, so
estimate 1 .9 mechanical joints per mechanical fitting. These assumptions
result in the joint distribution listed in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5. Estimated joint distribution.
S, SS, Al:
• Hand welded joints: 6331 •
Auto welded joints: 3438
Mechanical joints: 1788






In addition to the bending data included in Table 7.3, the study
counted the actual number of bends for each material. This data is
listed in Table 7.6.
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No data was provided by the study regarding NDT inspection re-
quirement and surface treatment. For all of the other processes, though,
the real and estimated data can be used to sketch a "loaded" shop routing
tree. Figure 7.11 shows a routing tree loaded with the' entire FFG piping
workload. All numbers in Figure 7.11 are numbers of assemblies, except
for the numbers on the branches through the hand and automatic welding
blocks. These numbers are followed by an (f) and denote the number of
fittings. One additional assumption that went into Figure 7.11 regards
the number of final assembled assemblies. It is taken as the number of
welded/brazed assemblies multiplied by twice the ratio of mechanical fit-
tings to welded/brazed fittings. The logic behind this is that if 5328
welded fittings result in 1730 welded assemblies, then there are an aver-
age of 3.1 welded fittings per welded assembly. It is not reasonable to
assume a mechanical fitting density that high, so it is .assumed to be
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N = Number of mechanical assemblies
ma
N , = Number of welded/brazed assemblies
wba
N = Number of mechanical fittings
mf
N _ = Number of welded/brazed fittings
wbf
p = Density of welded/brazed fittings
wbf
Similarly, 2453 copper and copper alloy assemblies require final assem-
bly.
While loading the routing tree with numbers of assemblies might be
interesting, it is too general to be of practical use. Figure 7-12 shows
the routing tree loaded with the number of process applications—number
of cuts, bends, welds, brazes, mechanical joints, etc. The number of
cuts is derived from applying the ratio of number of assemblies to the
total number of cuts. 22.8% of the assemblies are steel, stainless
steel, or aluminum, so it is assumed that 22.8% of the total cuts are in
steel, stainless steel, or aluminum pipe. In actuality, that distinction
matters very little, and cutting information is not even included in the
GT code to begin with. Relative loading in Figure 7.12 is shown with
only numbers, not path width. Figure 7.12 is more usable than Figure
7.11 since it quantifies the process data rather than quantifying aggre-
gate assembly data.
The GT code could serve as the data base from which to produce
loaded routing trees for any given group of assemblies. The only infor-
mation presented in Figure 7.12 that could not come from the GT code is
number of cuts and the division between hand and automatic welding. Cut-
ting information was intentionally neglected for reasons outlined in




To be truly useful for workload balancing, two additional steps
would need to be taken. First, a time or labor calculating algorithm
would need to be included in the code processing software. Second,
scheduling data would need to accompany the code. That would enable the
shop to look at the actual- workstation workload for any given time
period, and take preventive action to avoid impending bottlenecks or,
conversely, underutilization of manpower or equipment. Actual scheduling
data will not be included in this thesis. A simple labor algorithm, how-
ever, will be applied to the process data in order to produce a time or
labor loaded routing tree.
The basis of the labor algorithm will be the NASSCO report refer-
enced in Chapter 6.(^2) It presented recommended labor planning for a
number of pipe fabrication processes. These requirements include non-
process time and are listed in man-minutes in Table 7.7. Although
Table 7.7. Workstation labor requirements for pipe shop processes.
(Non-process time included.)
Cutting All sizes 5.6 man-minutes/cut
Bending <2.5" 15 man-minute s/bend
2.5" - 4" 22.5
>4" 52.5
Weld fit up <4" 13.1 man-minutes/fitting
>4" 26.1
Hand welding <4" 11.6 + 5 (checkout)
>4" 24.8 + 5
Autowelding <4" 8.1+5
>4" 17.3 + 5
Braze fit up <4" 13.1
>4" 26.1
Brazing <4" 7.7 + 5
>4" 16.5 + 5
Final assy <4" 8.7 + 5
>4" 18.6 + 5
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non-process time was not specifically defined, it is believed to be just
setup time. It was uniformly assumed to be 60% of the total time listed
for each process. The report did not distinguish welding time from braz-
ing time. Therefore, brazing fit-up time was estimated to be equal to
welding fit-up time, and actual brazing time was estimated to be two
thirds of the hand welding time. Mechanical assembly time was similarly
not included in the NASSCO report, so it has been estimated to be three
fourths of the hand welding time. Five minutes checkout time is allo-
cated to each assembled fitting.
The labor requirements listed in Table 7.7 are per fitting, not
per joint. In calculating the total labor requirements for all the FFG-7
piping assemblies, these numbers will be converted to a per-joint basis
by dividing by the assumed number of joints per fitting (1.5 for welds
and brazes, 1.9 for mechanical). Since Table 7.7 lists labor require-
ments rather than workstation time, workstation manning levels would have
to be included in the workload balancing software. It is undoubtedly
true that other shipyards might have significantly different time esti-
mates for each process; nevertheless, these estimates are sufficient to
produce a trial loaded tree for FFG piping assemblies.
Statistical data regarding size is required to proceed. The FFG
piping study at BIW counted bends as a function of pipe size. The re-
sults are grouped together in Table 7.8 into the three discrete levels
Table 7.8. FFG bends as a function of pipe size.
Pipe Size # Bends
£2.5 12,293




for which NASSCO gave separate time estimates. For all other processes,
since size data was not included in the BIW study, it will be assumed
that the size distribution is the same as the size distribution for pipe
length given by the Todd study in Table 5.3, except that piping 1/2 inch
and smaller will be neglected in order to make the Todd and BIW data
compatible. Neglecting the very small pipes would seem to be justified
by the fact that they are generally not fabricated in the shop anyway.
All gauge piping and some other small diameter low pressure piping (such
as for control air) is fabricated on board ship using hand tools. The
bending size distribution should not be used for joints, because fittings
are much more commonly used than bends on large pipes. Based on pipe
length, the percentage breakdown by size for joints is shown in Table
7.9. This is, in fact, significantly different from the bending distri-
bution, which has only 11.9% between 2.5 and 4 inches, and only 2.5%
above 4 inches. Assume annealing has the same distribution as all of
bending, and allow 2, 3, and 4 man-minutes to anneal the three respective
pipe sizes.









It is now possible to calculate total labor time for each major
workstation for all FFG-7 piping assemblies. The process repetitions
shown in Figure 7-12 and distributed in size according to Tables 7.8 and
7.9 can simply be multiplied by the labor time estimates. Materials will




Cutting: 21,505 * 5.6 = 120,428 man-minutes
= 2,007 man-hours
Annealing: (10,168 x 2X1414 x 3) + (297 x 4)
= 25,766 man-minutes
= 429 man-hours
Bending: (12,293 x 15) + (1708 x 22.5) + (356 :X 52.5)
= 241,515 man-minutes
= 4,025 man-hours
Cleaning after bending is very quick, but does require transport time to
and from the tanks. However, multiple bends on the same pipe would be
cleaned simultaneously. There are 14,357 bends spread throughout 8,919
bent assemblies, for an average of 1.6 bends per assembly. Assume that
all assembly bends are cleaned. Therefore, allow 3.7 man-minutes per
bend for cleaning, or, equivalently, 6 minutes per bent assembly.
Cleaning: 14,357 x 3.7 = 53,121 man-minutes
= 885 man-hours
Welding fit up: 9769
1 .5






(0.942 x 16.6 + 0.058 x 29.8)
= 7 3,295 man-minutes














Brazing: ^ (0.942 x 12.7 + 0.058 x 21.5)
= 237,673 man-minutes
= 3961 man-hours
Final assembly: 7821 (0.942 x 8.9 + 0.058 x 13.3)
= 71,603 man-minutes.
= 1193 man-hours
The labor estimates are summarized in Table 7-10. Figure 7.13
shows the resulting labor loaded routing tree. Estimates for NDT inspec-
tion and surface treatment will not be made due to lack of data. The
total manhours of the processes analyzed in this chapter is approximately
20,000. This in but a fraction of the several hundred thousand man-hours
typically spent by a shipyard pipe shop on an FFG-7. There are several
reasons for this rather large difference.
First, the calculations considered only shop fabrication. For any
given piping system, a rough rule of thumb is that 40% of the man-hours
are spent on fabrication and 60% are spent on installation. Furthermore,
some smaller systems are fabricated on board, requiring no shop work. If
the difference in total pipe length between the Todd and BIW studies is
due to Todd's inclusion of shipboard fabricated piping, then it amounts
to a very significant 25,000 ft of piping (roughly a third of the total
pipe length). Of the total pipe shop expenditures, therefore, perhaps
only a hundred thousand man-hours are spent in the shop, and some of
these are due to rework.
Second, the calculations did not include a number of pipe shop
operations. Besides NDT, cleaning, drilling, and threading, a pipe shop
also charges man-hours for work on flex hoses, waveguides, and, in some
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Weld fit up 1504
Hand welding 1222
Auto welding 521




yards, refrigeration and air conditioning compressors. While it is
doubtful that this work comprises a major share of a pipe shop's work-
load, it is not negligible.
Third, the calculations contained a number of gross estimates and
assumptions. Therefore, while the results are believed to be qualita-
tively accurate, there could be large quantitative discrepancies. Along
these same lines, the NASSCO labor estimates are based on NASSCO's exper-
ience building hospital ships. There is a high degree of uncertainty in
applying these estimates to naval combatant ship construction. Although
the basic processes involved are the same, the pipe materials and quality
assurance standards could be sufficiently different to make the results
questionable.
Finally, it is expected that there would be a fairly large differ-
ence between theoretical and actual shop expenditures. If there weren't
any difference, then there would be little room for productivity improve-
ment other than by reducing workstation time. While reducing workstation
time is certainly an excellent target for productivity improvements, the
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author believes that reduction of non-productive time between work-
stations is another viable target. The ultimate goal of process flow
lanes addresses both these issues.
For these types of calculations to be of practical use, the esti-
mates on which they were based would have to be greatly refined. The GT
code is a valuable tool for collecting the process data and organizing it
into a usable data base. The time estimating algorithms require addi-
tional study to improve their accuracy. The code is compatible with very
exact labor requirements data. Whether such data can actually be collec-
ted remains to be seen. The loosely organized work flow in existing pipe
shops makes the collection of accurate time and labor data difficult.
Finally, scheduling information would need to be incorporated in order to
have a viable workload balancing tool. With this additional data and
information, the GT pipe code could be of great value in increasing pipe
shop productivity.
7.4 Setup Time
Bending setup time can be minimized by using the code to identify
assemblies with identical bending machine die and clamp lock require-
ments. However, this effort must be balanced against the increase in
process inventory that would result. At one extreme, the codes for all
pipe assemblies that were to be produced in the shop during a large time
window would be scanned to identify identical setup requirements, and
these would be bent together as a batch. At the other extreme, all as-
semblies would be routed through the shop so that they were completed
just in time for installation, regardless of setup changes. While the
optimum procedure lies somewhere between these two extremes, it is un-
doubtedly much closer to the latter. It is really only large pipe sizes
that necessitate lengthy setup times, yet Table 7.8 shows that large pipe
bending is not all that common.
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If we assume that the pipe shop fabrication time for an FFG is
roughly one year, then there would be an average of about 1.4 bends over
four inches in diameter in the shop each working day for each FFG in the
pre-fabrication stage. In the average of 7 per week there might not be
any with identical setup requirements, but use of the code would provide
that information and allow a formal trade-off to be done between setup
time and in-process inventory. Besides detailed pipe bending data (which
could come from the code), the trade-off analysis would require detailed
scheduling data and specific economic data regarding the costs to the











































































Figure 7.3. Shop routing for assembly number two,
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Figure 7.11. Routing tree loaded with all FFG-7 piping assemblies.
Numbers indicate number of assemblies going through
each process, except for welding, where the numbers
followed by an (f) indicate number of fittings. It is
merely coincidence that the same number of Cu/CuNi
assemblies go through bending and brazing. They are









Figure 7.12. Routing tree loaded by the number of process























The application of modern shipbuilding techniques in the United
States is having a dramatic impact on shipyard productivity. The princi-
ples involved are not new; in fact, they were used extensively in this
country during WWII. While the design simplification and quantity pro-
duction that characterized WWII shipbuilding might never be duplicated,
the practices of standardization and prefabrication are being utilized
with increasing success. Prefabrication is applied today under the label
of zone construction and outfitting. Standardization of parts and assem-
blies used repetitively throughout a ship is achieving the benefits of
quantity production, even though we still produce very few ships.
Group technology can serve as the language of modern industrial
engineering techniques. It assists standardization by identifying impor-
tant product similarities, either from a design or a manufacturing point
of view. Most of the shipbuilding applications thus far have been in the
area of structural assemblies. It would appear, however, that pipe as-
semblies are another area in which GT application could be very bene-
ficial.
The nine-digit code developed in this thesis identifies the impor-
tant manufacturing attributes of shipboard pipe assemblies. It could
serve as the basis for work content estimating, workload balancing, and
setup time reduction. It also has limited usefulness in generative proc-
ess planning. Practical use of the code, however, will require better
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statistical data on pipe assemblies and labor requirements. Implementa-
tion of the code, in and of itself, would satisfy the pipe assembly data
requirement as all the assemblies become coded. Labor requirements
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